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Abstract 
The post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is a financial market anomaly disputed by the 
researchers for 50 years. The main feature of PEAD is that investors appear to underreact to 
earnings announcements, which causes stock prices to drift in the direction of the earnings news for 
some time after the announcement. This delayed price response is at face value seen as a violation 
against the efficient market hypothesis, because the immediate price reaction suggested by efficient 
market theory remains partly absent. What separates PEAD from other financial market anomalies 
is the major persistency of it and despite the extensive amount of research, the exact reasons for the 
anomaly have remained vague. 
Previous research on the anomaly has mainly focused on the U.S. stock markets, whereas 
international evidence of PEAD has remained scarce. In addition, most of the previous studies have 
focused on investor/market behavior and other firm-wise external factors as the drivers of the 
anomaly, while less attention has been given to the firm-related factors. Thus, the objective of this 
study was two-fold. First, it was examined whether and to what extent PEAD exists in the European 
(ex. UK) stock markets based on financial statement information released in 2018. Furthermore, it 
was explored how firm size and economic sector affect the magnitude and the length of PEAD. 
The main findings of the study include observing statistically significant PEAD in European (ex. 
UK) stock markets, especially among the firms who had reported negative news compared to what 
was expected by the analysts. This result implies an under-reaction to earnings information, which 
subsequently leads to a delayed price response (PEAD). Regarding the firms who had reported 
positive news compared to what was expected, an initial over-reaction to the earnings information 
was observed. After the initial over-reaction, a price correction in the form of negative abnormal 
returns was found to take place. These results together provide evidence contradicting the efficient 
market hypothesis. 
Additionally, firm size was found to be inversely related to the magnitude of PEAD, suggesting that 
for larger firms, there exists a more immediate price reaction after the earnings announcements. 
For smaller firms, in turn, the delayed price response was found to be more pronounced. The results 
of the analysis regarding the effect of economic sector on PEAD were, however, more unambiguous. 
A significant difference on PEAD was found only between Real Estate and Industrials sectors, a 
difference that could not be explained with firm size. Moreover, firm size and economic sector were 
found to be unassociated with the length of PEAD.  
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Post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) on markkina-anomalia, jonka olemassaolosta ja syistä 
tutkijat ovat väitelleet jo viidenkymmenen vuoden ajan. PEAD-ilmiö määritellään markkinoiden 
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usein todisteena tehokkaiden markkinoiden hypoteesia vastaan, koska välitön markkinareaktio 
uuteen tulosinformaatioon ei ole tarpeeksi suuri. PEAD:n vakavuutta muihin markkina-
anomalioihin nähden alleviivaa sen pysyvyys eri otosten ja ajanjaksojen välillä, sillä monet muista 
anomalioista ovat hävinneet ajan saatossa niiden saaman julkisuuden myötä. Huolimatta monista 
PEAD-ilmiötä käsittelevistä tutkimuksista, yksityiskohtaisia syitä anomalian olemassaololle ei ole 
pystytty esittämään. 
Aikaisemmat PEAD-ilmiötä koskevat tutkimukset ovat keskittyneet pääosin Yhdysvaltojen 
markkinoihin kansainvälisen tutkimustiedon kustannuksella. Sen lisäksi, aikaisempi tutkimus on 
keskittynyt selittämään PEAD-ilmiötä lähinnä markkinoiden sekä sijoittajien käyttäytymistä 
hyväksikäyttäen, kun taas yhtiökohtaiset tekijät ovat jääneet vähemmälle huomiolle. Tämä tutkimus 
pyrkii korjaamaan edellä esitetyt epäkohdat. Tutkimuksen ensimmäinen tavoite oli selvittää, missä 
määrin PEAD-ilmiö on läsnä Euroopan osakemarkkinoilla perustuen vuonna 2018 julkistettuun 
tilinpäätösinformaatioon. Toinen tavoite oli selvittää, miten yhtiöiden koko sekä toimiala 
vaikuttavat PEAD-ilmiön vahvuuteen sekä pituuteen. 
Yksi tämän tutkimuksen päätuloksista on se, että PEAD-ilmiö on läsnä tilastollisesti merkitsevänä 
Euroopan (pl. Iso-Britannia) osakemarkkinoilla etenkin niiden yhtiöiden osalta, jotka raportoivat 
negatiivisen tuloksen suhteessa analyytikkojen ennusteisiin. Tämä tulos kertoo alireagoinnista 
tulosinformaatioon, joka puolestaan johtaa viivästyneeseen markkinareaktioon. Sen sijaan 
positiivisen tulosyllätyksen raportoineiden yhtiöiden osalta markkinoilla oli havaittavissa 
ylireagointia, jonka jälkeen osakkeen hinta korjaantui negatiivisten epänormaalien tuottojen 
muodossa. Nämä tulokset yhdessä puhuvat tehokkaiden markkinoiden hypoteesia vastaan. 
Lisäksi yhtiön koko on tämän tutkimuksen perusteella kääntäen verrannollinen PEAD-ilmiön 
suuruuteen, eli suurempien yhtiöiden osalta osakkeen hinnanmuodostus on tehokkaampaa 
tulosjulkaisun jälkeen. Tulokset liittyen toimialan vaikutukseen eivät ole yhtä yksiselitteisiä, sillä 
merkittävä eroavaisuus PEAD-ilmiön suuruudessa löytyi vain kiinteistö- ja teollisuussektorien 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
During the vast history of financial markets, researchers across the globe have found 
numerous market anomalies contradicting with the core assumption of efficient market 
hypothesis. As defined by Schwert (2003), market anomalies in such are well-documented 
empirical results that are inconsistent with the maintained theories of asset-pricing 
behaviour. They indicate either that the markets are inefficient or that there are 
inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing models. As further described by Schwert 
(2003), examples of the well-known anomalies include the small-firm effect (see e.g. Banz 
& Reingaum 1981), the January effect (see e.g. Keim & Reingaum 1983; Roll 1983), the 
weekend effect (see e.g. French 1980; Keim & Stambaugh 1984; Schwert 1990), the value 
effect (see e.g. Ball 1978; Basu 1977; Fama & French 1992) and the momentum effect (see 
e.g. DeBondt & Thaler 1985; Fama & French 1996; Jegadeesh & Titman 1993).  
One of the most interesting findings regarding this particular field of research is that many 
of the popular anomalies do not eventually seem to hold between different time periods 
or even between different samples in the same time period. This may suggest the 
possibility that some or even most of the market anomalies are after all more apparent 
than actually real. (Schwert 2003). Despite these type of findings across various anomalies, 
there does exist one robust financial market anomaly whose persistence has been 
documented by dozens of studies, between different time periods and across various 
samples and countries. This anomaly is called the post-earnings announcement drfit 
(henceworth also PEAD), essentially the first-ever documented major accounting-based 
anomaly discovered initially by Ball & Brown (1968). 
The main feature of PEAD is that investors appear to underreact to earnings 
announcements. Consequently, a company’s stock price and the cumulative abnormal 
returns for that stock tend to drift or fluctuate in the direction of the earnings news several 
days or even weeks after the earnings announcement, contrary to the immidiate reaction 
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suggested by the efficient market hypothesis. (Livnat & Mendenhall 2006; Richardson et al. 
2010). This means that for firms reporting negative (positive) news compared to what was 
expected, their abnormal security returns tend to drift upward (downward) for some time 
following the earnings announcements (Scott 2015).  
More originally, Bernard & Thomas (1989) defined PEAD as “the systematic pattern of a 
stock’s abnormal return to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise for a period of time 
subsequent an earnings announcement”. Hirshleifer et al. (2008) have taken a broader 
view themselves and define PEAD as “the tendency for stocks to earn high positive average 
abnormal returns in the three quarters subsequent to extreme positive earnings surprises 
and, more strongly, to earn negative average abnormal returns in the three quarters 
subsequent to extreme negative earnings surprises”. In statistical terms, market anomalies 
like this imply serial correlation of stock returns, whereas under market efficiency the serial 
correlation would equal zero (Scott 2015).  
Ever since the original study by Ball & Brown (1968), the PEAD anomaly has been referred 
to as “the granddaddy of all underreaction events” (Fama 1998) and “the most severe 
challenge to financial theorists” (Brennan 1991), mainly because of its major persistence. 
Ball (1992) further notes that the anomaly has been replicated concistently and with 
increasing precision in one of the most carefully and thoroughly researched areas of the 
empirical financial economics literature. Taken at face value, he adds, this anomaly implies 
that stock markets “grossly fail the test of competitive economic theory” and challenges 
the assumptions underlying most of the widely-used models in the modern financial 
economics. Despite the five decades of research on the matter, there is still no consensus 
to date regarding the source(s) of the drift (Ayers et al. 2011) and it is still perceived as a 
puzzle from the perspective of the efficient market hypothesis (Hirshleifer et al. 2011). 
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1.2. Purpose & main findings 
Most of the previous studies on PEAD are structured with U.S. data and focus on the effects 
of investor/market behaviour and other firm-wise external factors as the determinants and 
drivers of PEAD. More precisely, this means that the effects of trading and distinct investor 
groups (see e.g. Ayers et al. 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2008), analyst forecasts and behaviour 
(see e.g. Li & Tse 2008; Wang 2008; Zhang 2008), liquidity risk (see e.g. Chordia et al. 2009; 
Sadka 2005) and trading costs (see e.g. NG et al. 2008) have been quite thoroughly 
examined. At the same time, less attention has been given to the firm-related factors as 
the possible drivers of PEAD. In addition, the comprehensive studies with U.S. data have 
somewhat overshadowed the limited studies considering other stock markets, so further 
out-of-sample research has the potential to shed new light on the anomaly. Indeed, Gerard 
(2012) points out that due to several data limitations, the evidence for PEAD in Europe is 
relatively scarce. Moreover, the research regarding PEAD is generally quite well up to date, 
so additional studies are able maximize their contribution to the matter by focusing on 
rather recently published financial information. 
Thus, the scope of this study includes specifying the extent to which PEAD is present in the 
European (ex. UK) stock markets based on financial statement earnings information 
released in 2018. In addition, this study aims to determine how firm size and economic 
sector as the internal firm-related factors affect the anomaly in question. By doing so, this 
study attempts to fill in the research voids described earlier. What is however beyond the 
scope of this study is the portfolio construction method presented in some of the previous 
studies to further examine how investors could have in practice benefitted from the 
anomaly. As this method would require, among other details, the determination of the 
applicable transaction costs of forming such a specific portfolio, this study leaves at stating 
whether such a further examination would at all be reasonable based on the magnitude  of 
PEAD. 
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This study is consequently formed based on two distinct research questions:   
1. To what extent is PEAD present in the European (ex. UK) stock markets based on 
financial statement earnings information released in 2018?  
 
2. How well do firm size and economic sector explain the possibly observed PEAD?  
The final purpose of this study is to find an answer to the second question, which is also 
the main research question. The first question is a preliminary research question, which 
serves as a prerequisite for fulfilling the final purpose. 
The main findings of this study inculde observing statistically significant PEAD in European 
stock markets in 2018 especially among the firms who had reported negative earnings news 
compared to what analysts had forecasted. This finding suggests an underreaction to 
earnings news among the bad news stocks, whereas an initial overreaction to earnings 
information was observed among the firms who had reported a positive earnings surprise. 
Moreover, firm size was found to be inversely related to the magnitude of the PEAD 
(greater size implies milder deviation from the expected returns), whereas the effect of 
economic sector on PEAD was found to be of more ambiguos nature. In addition, firm size 
and economic sector were found not to have an effect on the length of PEAD. 
1.3. Methodology & structure 
The empirical part of this study is divided into two sections based on the two distinct 
research questions.  First, the magnitude and significance of the anomaly in the European 
stock markets were examined with an event study considering published financial 
statement information between 1.1.2018 – 30.9.2018 and the subsequent stock behavior. 
The event study was conducted with the aARC program at www.eventstudytools.com to 
find out the average abnormal returns (AARs) and the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) for the sample stocks in the event window. The statistical significance of 
the AARs and CAARs was further tested with Adjusted Patell Z-test to assess the statistical 
significance of PEAD as a whole. This analysis was conducted to answer the preliminary 
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research question (Question 1) and the methodology in detail is further described in 
chapter 4.1. 
Second, the firm-specific intrinsic values of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as well 
as the firm-specific drift lengths from the event date onwards, both derived from the first 
phase, were explained with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. The regression 
analysis was conducted to answer the main research question (Question 2). A more 
detailed description considering the deployed regression models and the independent and 
dependent variables can be found in chapter 4.2. 
After this brief introduction to the matter, the structure of this thesis is as follows. In 
chapter 2, the theoretical framework of PEAD is reviewed along with previous literature 
regarding the anomaly. In chapter 3, the research hypotheses are constructed based on the 
previous research information. Empirical methods and data are elucidated in chapters 4 
and 5, respectively, while chapter 6 dives thoroughly into the empirical findings and 
provides some discussion and limitations. Finally, chapter 7 concludes with ideas for future 
research. 
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2. Post-Earnings Announcement Drift 
This chapter is organized so that the reader can get a glimpse on the anomaly from various 
theoretical perspectives. As a starting point, the theory of efficient markets is explained as 
its definition is one of the key preliminary assumptions regarding the final conclusions on 
how the PEAD anomaly effects the theoretical framework of efficient financial markets. In 
addition, the technical properties of PEAD are explained. These include the definitions for 
earnings surprise and abnormal returns and how the definitions of these concepts may 
effect the magnitude of PEAD. Moreover, this chapter sums up the previous evidence on 
the anomaly in different markets as well as in different time periods and goes through the 
main reasons proposed for the anomaly. Finally, this chapter reviews the practical 
implications and consequences of PEAD. 
2.1. Efficient markets hypothesis 
Accounting theorists began to realize the importance of the efficient securities market 
already in the late 1960’s and since then, the theory of efficient markets has guided the 
related research and has had major implications for accounting as a practice (Scott 2015). 
As defined by Fama (1970), the primary role of the capital markets is the allocation of 
ownership of the economy’s capital stock. He adds that generally, if market prices provide 
accurate signals for resource allocation, we find ourselves in the market ideal. However, 
the efficient markets theory itself is a model of how a securities market operates and like 
any other model, it does not fully capture the complexity of such a market. Thus, the 
relevant question is not if the markets are efficient or not but rather the degree of 
efficiency. That is, how close the actual markets are to the full efficiency ideal. (Scott 2015). 
To assess this question, previous literature (e.g. Fama 1970; Jensen 1978; Fama 1991) has 
defined three different forms of market efficiency. These forms are called weak form, semi-
strong form and strong form and are respectively defined as follows: 
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Weak form: An efficient securities market is one where the prices of the securities traded 
on that market at all times fully reflect all past trading data. In such case, technical analysis 
is useless and cannot generate abnormal returns. 
Semi-strong form:  An efficient securities market is one where the prices of the securities 
traded on that market at all times fully reflect all information that is publicly known about 
these securities. In such case, fundamental analysis is fruitless and cannot generate 
abnormal returns. 
Strong form:  An efficient securities market is one where the prices of the securities traded 
on that market at all times fully reflect all possible information (public and insider 
information) about these securities. Under this extreme form of efficiency, abnormal 
returns cannot be generated using any information, because it has already been absorbed 
into the security prices. 
According to Scott (2015), it is quite apparent that stock prices in the real world are not 
reflecting the strong form of efficiency because of the high costs of elimininating all insider 
information. In addition, Fama (1991) points out that since there are information and 
trading costs present in the markets, the extreme form of the market efficiency hypothesis 
is surely false. Nor is the weak form very usable, because in such case the information 
contained for example in financial statements (e.g. in balance sheet, P/L statement, notes) 
would not be reflected in the stock prices, which obviously is not the case. Due to this 
reasoning, it is justified to use the semi-strong form of market efficiency as the baseline for 
the term “market efficiency”.  
To further assess the matter, market efficiency should not be seen as a solid state but 
rather as a fluctuating concept. If the markets were perfectly efficient and every investor 
knew it, there would be no reward in form of higher profits for collecting information. 
Information collection and security analysis is costly (at least when measured with 
opportunity costs), and if these costs are not to be compensated in form of higher 
(abnormal) returns, every market participant would diversify their investments to minimize 
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the firm-specific risk and believe in current market prices. However, if no one collects or 
acts on information, the markets can no longer be efficient. 
Regarding this issue, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) have stated that markets can actually 
never be 100% informationally efficient. According to them, there must be some quantity 
of abnormal profits to be made to compensate the informed investors for the costs of 
information collection. However, in equilibrium, the abnormal profits gained by informed 
investors equal exactly the costs of collecting the information (Grossman & Stiglitz 1980). 
As further mentioned by Jensen (1978) and Fama (1991), asset prices are reflecting 
information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits 
to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs. This is viewed as an economically more 
sensible version of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1991). 
Scott (2015) notes that there are a few points about this kind of market efficiency that are 
particularly noteworthy. First, by definition, market prices are viewed as efficient even 
though they do not reflect insider information. There are persons who posses insider 
information and know more than the market, and they may be able to earn excess profits 
on their investments at the expense of outsiders. Consequently, one of the major functions 
of accounting in general is to convert insider information into publicly known information 
via timely and reliable reporting practices. Nevertheless, Scott (2015) continues, investors 
will still be worried about the existing possibility of insider trading. 
Second, it is pointed out by Scott (2015) that market efficiency is a relative concept and the 
market will subsequently be efficient relative to the amount of publicly available 
information. It should be further emphasized that even though markets are viewed as 
efficient, there is absolutely nothing in the definition suggesting that the stock prices are 
reflecting the real underlying values of the stocks. For example, during the market 
meltdown in 2007-2008, the market prices of asset-backed securities and the firms that 
issued them clearly overstated their value in retrospect. However, the important question 
regarding the semi-strong form of market efficiency is whether at that time the prices of 
such securities reflected all publicly available information or not. (Scott 2015). 
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Finally and most interestingly, Scott (2015) notes that if the markets are efficient, serial 
correlations of stock returns should not exist and a security’s market price should randomly 
fluctuate over time. If a firm reports good news (bad news) today, its stock price should 
immidiately rise (fall) to reflect these news. If, however, the stock price continues to rise or 
fall during the following days in the absence of any further news, it can be viewed as 
evidence in favour of market inefficiency. (Scott 2015). This inherently leads to the 
conclusion that if PEAD is defined as the observed serial correlation of abnormal returns in 
the post-earnings announcement period (e.g. Bernard & Thomas 1989; Hirshleifer et al. 
2008; Livnat & Mendenhall 2006; Richardson et al. 2010), the anomaly is at face value an 
offense against the efficient market hypothesis. 
2.2. Earnings surprise 
Before the actual magnitude of PEAD can be measured, firms in a particular sample are 
typically divided into at least two groups: firms who have reported good news (positive 
earnings surprise) and firms who have reported bad news (negative earnings surprise) 
compared to what was expected. The terms “good” and “bad” are relative concepts, so it 
is important first to determine the baseline to which the reported earnings are compared 
to. It should be noted that a negative (positive) earnings surprise does not in such imply 
that a particular firm recorded a loss (profit). Had a firm reported a loss of one million euros, 
the surprise would still be viewed as positive if a more severe loss was expected. Similarly, 
had a firm reported a profit of one million euros, the surprise would still be viewed as 
negative if a larger profit was expected.  
In previous literature, the two most common concepts used regarding this matter are the 
seasonal random-walk based earnings surprise and the analyst forecast based earnings 
surprise. They can be further calculated either as absolute surpises or as relative surprises. 
In the case of relative surprises, the commonly used term is Standardized Unexpected 
Earnings (SUE), which refers to the method that the absolute surprise is stanrdardized for 
example with the firm’s stock price. This, in turn, makes it easier to compare the earnings 
surprises among different companies. 
 
 
10 
 
Seasonal random-walk based earnings surprise or, interchangeably, time-series model of 
expected earnings is defined in previous studies (e.g.  Ayers et al. 2011; Bernard & Thomas 
1989, 1990; Doyle et al. 2006, Livnat & Mendenhall 2006) as actual earnings minus the 
expected earnings scaled with a particular variable, for example stock price: 
RW = (EPSt – EPSt-4)/Pt-1                               (1) 
where  
RW       =   seasonal random-walk based earnings surprise 
EPSt      =  actual earnings per share (EPS) for quarter t 
EPSt-4   =  actual EPS for quarter t-4   
Pt-1        =  stock price at the beginning of quarter t 
Similar to Equation 1, the analyst forecast based earning surprise is measured as holding 
the reported earnings and the price deflator constant, while replacing the proxy for 
expected earnings with an analyst forecast (eg. Ayers et al. 2011; Livnat & Mendenhall 
2006): 
AF = (EPSt – AFt)/Pt-1                               (2) 
where EPSt  and Pt-1  are defined as in Equation 1 and 
AF   =  analyst forecast based earning surprise 
AFt   =  analyst forecast of EPSt 
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Henceworth, the seasonal random-walk based earnings surprise is being referred to as the 
RW surprise and the subsequent post-earnings announcement drift as the RW drift. 
Similarly, the analyst forecast based earning surprise is being referred to as the AF surprise 
and the subsequent post-earnings announcement drift as the AF drift. 
As stated, the two models differ from each others only in terms of the proxy used for 
expected earnings. With the RW surprise, the most common practice is to use the actual 
earnings the year before as the proxy for expected earnings but with AF surprise, it is 
possible to use either the most recent analyst forecast (e.g. Ayers et al. 2011) or the 
consensus forecasts of all analysts (e.g. Livnat & Mendenhall 2006). However, Brown and 
Caylor (2005, see Brown & Kim 1991) argue that the most recent analyst forecast is a better 
suited proxy for two distinct reasons. First, the effects of pre-announcements are mitigated 
when using the most recent forecast and second, the most recent forecast is evidently 
more closely related to the stock price reaction to earnings announcements. 
With U.S. data from 1987 to 2003, Livnat & Mendenhall (2006) examined the potential 
differences in abnormal returns generated by portfolios formed based on these competing 
measures of earnings surprise. They reported that although the majority of prior 
researchers had used the seasonal random-walk based forecast measure, the drift using 
the analyst-based forecast was actually consistently and significantly larger. According to 
the researchers, this result implies that either these two measures of forecasting are both 
capturing different forms of stock market mispricing or that some of the prior explanations 
for the anomaly (e.g. overreliance on RW forecasts) may be too hasty. 
Doyle et al. (2006) have also shown similar results with U.S. data ranging from 1988 to 2000. 
By defining earnings surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time-series 
(seasonally random-walk based) model, they documented abnormal returns in the event 
window that were much larger and more persistent than shown in previous studies. 
Interesting from the perspective of this particular study is that the results obtained by 
Doyle et al. (2006) were not concentrated in a few industries and that firms with extreme 
earnings surprise were generally found to be smaller than the average firm. 
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In addition, Doyle et al. (2006) found that the firms with extreme earnings surprises tended 
to be “forgotten” stocks with relatively high book-to-market ratios, low analyst coverage 
and high analyst forecasts dispersion. Moreover, firms with extreme positive earnings 
surprises tended to have persistent earnings surprises in the same direction for three 
subsequent years. Abnormal returns were documented to be highest when the transaction 
costs were highest and interest of institutional investor is lowest, consistent with the idea 
that market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large 
(sophisticated) investors to exploit the inefficiencies. Finally, the results of Doyle et al. 
(2006) are reported to hold even after controlling for risk (as measured by beta, firm size 
and book-to-market ratio) and after controlling for other market anomalies such as price 
momentum, accruals, pro forma exclusions and PEAD based on RW surprise. 
2.3. Previous evidence from U.S. 
According to Ball (1992), the PEAD anomaly is scientifically so indisputable that the 
contentious issue is not anymore the existence of the anomaly but its explanation. 
Although the vast amount of literature and studies on the matter, the proposed reasons 
for the anomaly are still manyfold and there is no single consensus among researchers 
regarding the source(s) of the drift (Ayers et al. 2011). To gain a more comprehensive 
understanding on what probably causes the anomaly, this study approaches the dispute by 
dividing the proposed reasons into two main aggregates, which can be furthermore divided 
into different subparts. These main aggregates are the perspective of poor risk adjustment 
and the perspective of market inefficiency, defined respectively as follows (e.g. Ayers et al. 
2011; Bernard & Seyhun 1997; Bernard & Thomas 1989; Richardson et al. 2010): 
Poor risk adjustment perspective: The abnormal returns occur due to some unindentified 
risk factors and thus, the “abnormal” returns are nothing more than a justifiable 
compensation for that unaccounted amount of risk, in line with the efficient market theory. 
Market inefficiency perspective: Market participants are unable to fully incorporate the 
future predictability of the true earnings time series into their decisions, which creates 
abnormal returns and implies market inefficiency. 
 
 
13 
 
Before digging into the vast evidence on the matter and making conclusions about the most 
plausible explanation, a few points about testing market efficiency should be noted.  
Bernard and Seyhyn (1997) point out that regarding the dispute of whether PEAD is more 
likely resulting from market inefficiencies or from failures to control for risk, there exists an 
underlying disorder called the joint hypothesis problem. First pointed out by Fama (1970), 
the joint hypothesis problem suggets that it is impossible to test market efficiency without 
silmultaneously assuming and testing also some model of expected returns. Thus, it is “not 
possible to assure that evidence apparently at odds with market efficiency is not actually 
an indication of shortcomings in the hypothesized asset pricing model and its 
characterization of risk” (Bernard & Seyhun 1997). The joint hypothesis problem in such 
leads to the unwieldy conclusion that market efficiency per se is an untestable hypothesis 
(Fama 1991).  
To illustrate the difference, it can for the sake of simplicity be assumed that a trading 
strategy producing abnormal returns has been found. If, for example, the capital-asset 
pricing model (CAPM) has been used to determine the magnitude of abnormal returns in 
the first place, two alternative interpretations are possible. First, it can be assumed that 
the CAPM as the underlying model is right and true evidence of market inefficiency has 
been found. Second, in the absence of any further information, it can as well be concluded 
that CAPM as the underlying assumption is misspecified and once a well-specified risk 
correction to the model is made, the “abnormal” returns disappear. This in turn is an 
argument in favour of the efficient market theory. The joint hypothesis problem is 
consequently present also in all of the following studies on PEAD, and because of that 
problem, “precise inferences about the degree of market efficiency are likely to remain 
impossible” (Fama 1991). 
2.3.1. The perspective of poor risk-adjustment 
As stated, the first main aggregate of reasons for PEAD is that following the earnings 
announcements, the subsequent abnormal returns occur due to some unidentified risk 
factors. Because of this, the “abnormal” returns are no longer seen as abnormal but as a 
normal compensation for increased risk, in line with the efficient markets theory. This view 
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originally rose and gained attention because given how visible and widely followed earnings 
announcements are, attributions of such evidence to market inefficiency were greeted with 
skepticism (Bernard & Seyhun 1997). Ball (1978) has argued that there are reasons to 
believe ex ante that stock markets are efficient, but even in an efficient market, trading 
strategies based on earnings numbers may appear to generate abnormal returns due to 
the misspecifications in the model used to measure the abnormal returns. Foster et al. 
(1984) as well as Ball et al. (1993) have further provided substancial but at the same time 
ambivalent evidence regarding this argument. 
In their study, Foster et al. (1984) had two alternative approaches in analyzing the post-
announcement behaviour of stock returns. The first was an earnings-based model (EBM), 
in which the unexpected earnings of NYSE and AMEX firms (measured by using a statistical 
earnings forecast and scaled by the standard deviation of prior forecast errors) were 
compared to the cross-sectional distribution of scaled unexpected earnings for the prior 
quarter. According to their standing relative to that distribution, firms were assigned to ten 
different portfolios. Finally, the size-adjusted abnormal returns of those ten portfolios were 
plotted over the 120 trading days surrounding the earnings announcement date. The 
second approach assigned firms to portfolios on the basis of firms’ estimated abnormal 
returns over the 60 days prior to the earnings announcement day (including the actual 
earnings announcement day), labeled as the security-return model (SRM).  
The essential result of Foster et al. (1984) is that the PEAD was found to be significant only 
under the earnings-based model, but not under the security-return model. The conlcusion 
drawn by some researchers based on these results is that the PEAD might in fact reflect 
some problems in risk measurement: “Using the SRM method of forming portfolios yields 
no unusual return behaviour following the earnings announcement and suggests again that 
the results of previous studies are caused by a misspecified pricing model” (Bernard & 
Thomas 1989, see Dyckman & Morse 1986).  
However, Bernard & Thomas (1989) add that these kind of conclusions may be too rushed. 
They state that the results obtained by Foster et al. (1984) are “consistent not only with 
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certain explanations under which the drift represents a risk premium but also with certain 
other explanations where the drift reflects a delayed price response”, ergo market 
inefficiency. More specifically, Bernard & Thomas (1989) show that if there exists a delayed 
price response to earnings announcements and the fraction of the delayed total response 
varies sufficiently across firms, it is possible to simultaneously detect a drift in the EBM test 
but not in the SRM test. As a result, it is suggested by Bernard & Thomas (1989) that rather 
than discriminating between CAPM misspecification and delayed price response, the 
results of Foster et al. (1984) should be viewed as imposing restrictions on the nature of 
CAPM misspecifications as well as on the delayed price response. Hence, after viewing 
these results, the overall question of which of the two main aggregates after all causes 
PEAD remains unanswered.  
Addressing the same matter, Ball et al. (1993) pointed out that since some prior studies 
assumed betas to be stationary in the CAPM used to calculate the abnormal returns, this 
caused a bias in estimated abnormal returns. According to them, this bias occurs due to the 
fact that betas are actually shifting upward for firms with high unexpected earnings and 
downward for firms with low unexpected earnings. To resolve this problem, they used an 
estimation approach permitting the betas in the CAPM to shift annually. After allowing 
betas to move this way, they found that PEAD was no longer significant. However, a more 
recent test conducted by the very same researchers with quarterly (not annual) data 
indicated significance in PEAD even after allowing beta to shift (Bernard & Thomas 1989), 
so the evidence is also hereby mixed. 
More recently, Bernard & Seyhun (1997) verged on the matter by using a stochastic 
dominance approach. They handled the joint hypotheses problem described earlier by 
making only two very mild assumptions about asset pricing. First, it was assumed that 
investors in general prefer more wealth to less and second, investors in general were 
assumed to be risk-averse. If the former was assumed, the first-order stochastic dominance 
of one security over another would imply an arbitrage opportunity. Second-order 
stochastic dominance would also imply an arbitrage opportunity, as long as the latter 
assumption holds. (Bernard & Seyhun 1997). 
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Before going into the results of that study, it is important to note a few things about the 
methodology and framework in question. According to Bernard & Seyhun (1997), the 
problem with stochastic dominance testing is that it demands so much of the data that 
even clear market inefficiencies might fail to produce trading strategies that are 
stochastically dominant. However, they reason that if there are instances where stochastic 
dominance can be evidenced, then such a conclusion should eliminate any reasonable 
concerns that the market anomaly in question could be due to a failure to control for risk. 
To prove their point, the researchers focused on a longer-term (3 to 6 month) PEAD, 
because the risk adjustment explanation is more plausible when using a wider time frame: 
“only over the longer interval does the drift (resulting from failures in risk adjustments) 
plausibly exceed normal transaction costs” (Bernard & Seyhun 1997). In other words, they 
used a time frame in favour of the risk adjustment explanation, which emphasizes the 
importance of the following results.  
With their portfolio construction, Bernard & Seyhun (1997) found undisputable evidence 
that the porfolio of stocks with standardized unexpected earnings in the highest decile 
dominated the portfolio in the lowest decile by first-order stochastic dominance. To further 
explain the meaning of that result, it is worthwhile to note that the estimated probability 
of obtaining such a result by chance is less that 0.5 %. Even after allowing for 3 % round-
trip transaction costs, the highest SUE decile portfolio dominated the lowest by second-
order stochastic dominance. This result, according to the researchers, “should eliminate 
any reasonable concern that risk adjustment problems explain the phenomenon” and 
“constitutes compelling evidence of market inefficiency”. Finally, they state that an 
understanding of this anomaly seems to indeed require either some model of inefficient 
markets, or identification of some other than transaction cost that delay the absorption of 
accounting information in stock prices. Therefore, the attempts to explain PEAD would be 
most fruitfully focused on reasons why market prices do not reflect all available 
information. (Bernard & Seyhun 1997). The following section attempts to shed light and 
provide answers for this question. 
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2.3.2. The perspective of market inefficiency 
As no unanimous evidence for the claim that PEAD exists due to the failures in risk 
measurement has been found to date, recent studies have focused more on the market 
inefficiency perspective. This perspective is driven by the attempts to identify possible 
reasons preventing the absorption of public information into stock prices. Eventually, it all 
seems to come down to the fact that information in the modern capital market is quite 
endless by nature, which in turn leads to the conclusion that some market participants 
remain more informed than others. In addition, as from the investors’ perspective time 
and attention are valuable resources, more is generally known about some companies than 
others. 
Investor sophistication 
An underlying assumption and a starting point for hypothesis development in the studies 
considering the level of investor sophistication as the driver of PEAD is that individual 
investors as a group are generally seen to be less sophisticated than institutional investors. 
Thus, PEAD as a sign of market inefficiency may result more from the trading behaviour of 
individual (unsophisticated) investors than from that of the institutional (sophisticated) 
investors. (e.g. Bartov et al. 2000; Doyle et al. 2006; Hirshleifer et al. 2008). 
First, Doyle et al. (2006) have documented the abnormal returns subsequent to earnings 
announcements to be highest when the interest of institutional investors in a company is 
lowest. This suggests that institutional investors, who are perceived as sophisticated and 
well-informed, are generally able to drive the price reaction to occur more immidiately 
after the earnings announcements. In addition, the researchers showed that returns for 
PEAD trading strategy are larger the higher the bid-ask spread and the lower the average 
trade size or the number of trades are. These results are consistent with the idea that 
market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large 
(sophisticated) investors to exploit the inefficiencies (Doyle et al. 2006). 
Supporting these results, Bartov et al. (2000) found that PEAD is diluted when a greater 
proportion of a firm’s stocks is held by institutional investors. They find that especially the 
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RW drift decreases when the level of institutional ownership increases and conclude that 
institutional investors seem to improve the efficiency with which RW earnings surprises are 
priced. However, they do not investigate the AF drift or specifically link investors trades to 
the RW drift. In addition, Scott (2015, see Ke & Ramalingegowda 2005) notes that some 
institutions actually seem to earn arbitrage profits by trading on PEAD, but other strategies 
such as buy & hold or momentum trading dominate the PEAD strategy so that the amount 
of their trading on PEAD is well short of what would be needed to arbitrage the anomaly 
away.  
In contrast, Hirshleifer et al. (2008) examined all trades made by a sample of individual 
investors through a major discount brokerage firm in US from 1991 to 1996 to find out if 
PEAD can be attributed to individual (unsophisticated) investor behaviour. They found, on 
the contrary to what was hypothesized, that individual investors as a group do not seem to 
drive PEAD. One of the provided reasons for that was the maybe too simple dichotomy 
between sophisticated institutional investors and unsophisticated individual investors. 
They mention that it is worthwhile to note that sometimes institutions trade poorly with 
respect to anomalies and that there are also individual investors who can be perceived 
objectively as smart market parcitipants. However, the researcher conclude by asking that 
if individual investors and institutional investor do not seem to drive PEAD, who does?  
Hirshleifer et al. (2008) as well Bartov et al. (2000) further point out that there is actually 
mixed evidence of whether the level of institutional shareholding is after all a good enough 
proxy for investor sophistication, as a good proxy in a research design should essentially be 
interchangeable with the variable it is meant to measure. If that is not the case, the 
framework of that design will be biased and corrupted. In addition to the level of 
institutional shareholding, another ambivalent proxy used for investor sophistication is the 
trade size. According to Richardson et al. (2010), the quality of the trade size proxy is also 
questionable because over the last decade, the growing use of algorithmic trading among 
institutional investors has resulted in trade size getting smaller and smaller. This change in 
market microstructure has, according to them, made it harder to attribute small trades 
solely to individual (less sophisticated) investors. 
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A compelling detour around this mixed evidence can be found from the technical 
properties of the anomaly and the subsequent definitons of RW and AF drift. Livnat & 
Mendenhall (2006) have argued that “if researchers do not understand how the magnitude 
of the drift depends on the specification of the earning surprise, they stand little chance of 
understanding the nature of the anomaly”. Whereas the already referred studies tried to 
attribute the PEAD as a whole to the distinct sets of investors, recent studies have taken 
the words of Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) into account and gone further to divide the 
anomaly into parts to find meaningful and clarifying results. 
Ayers et al. (2011) have conducted a comprehensive study regarding this matter. They 
examined whether the two distinct drifts (RW drift & AF drift) are possibly attributable to 
different identifiable subsets of investors. Although prior studies (see e.g. Battalio & 
Mendenhall 2005; Bhattacharya 2001; Walther 1997) had already found that small traders 
were more likely to trade based on RW surprise and large traders were more likely to trade 
based on AF surprise, the work by Ayers et al. (2011) is actually the first study ever to link 
the subsequent drifts to these two different groups of investors.  
Using U.S. trade and quote data of trades executed from 1993 to 2005, the researchers 
found compelling results in line with what was hypothesized: only small traders seem to 
systematically trade in the direction of the RW surprise after the earnings announcements 
and only large traders seem to trade in the direction of the AF surprise after earnings 
announcements. This evidence, according to the researchers, is consistent with the two 
distinct sets of traders explaining, at least in part, the two different forms of PEAD.   
In addition, Ayers et al. (2011) have further documented some interesting remarks about 
the two distinct drifts. First, they show that when traders trade more intensely in the 
direction of the earnings surprises during the announcement period, the magnitude of the 
subsequent drift is lower. This holds true with both of the drifts. In addition, they find that 
the RW and AF drifts are actually qualitatively different from each others. Large traders 
seem to trade more at the early stage of the post-announcement period, whereas small 
traders seem to spread their trades troughout the 60-day post-announcement period. 
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Moreover, they show that small trades around subsequent earnings announcements are 
actually predictable based on lagged one-to-four quarter RW surprises, but that there is no 
evidence of large trades at earnings announcements being associated with prior AF 
earnings surprises. This, according to the study, suggests that the RW drift but not the AF 
drift is largerly explained by small or unsophisticated investors’ failure to recognize the 
time-series property of earnings (originally suggested by Bernard & Thomas 1989) and 
therefore presents investor naivete.  
Finally, it is concluded by Ayers et al. (2011) that the AF drift has decreased in recent years 
(1999 onwards), while the magnitude of the RW drift has not changed. They point out that 
this result is consistent given the relatively new discovery of and the little attention that 
the AF drift has received in earlier years. This result adds to the work by Doyle et al. (2006) 
and Livnat & Mendenhall (2006), who at that time found the AF drift to be significantly 
larger than the RW drift.  
Limited attention 
Investors in general are seen to be restricted by limited amount of time and limited 
cognitive resources when making investment decisions (Dellavigna & Pollet 2009) and, 
because minds are finite, attention must be allocated selectively (Hirshleifer et al. 2009).  
Regarding this constraint, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) have constructed a framework called the 
investor distraction hypothesis. They present that as individuals aim to process multiple 
information sources at the same time, their performance will inevitably suffer. This 
suggests that an effort by an investor to process earnings announcement information and 
understand its implications for the profitability of a firm may be obstructed by additional 
news drawing attention towards other companies. Thus, greater amount of distraction 
suggests more severe underreaction to the earnings information, which leads to the 
realization of a weaker immediate price reaction and stronger post-earnings 
announcement drift. (Hirshleifer et al. 2009). 
When testing the investor distraction hypothesis with U.S. data ranging from 1995 to 2004, 
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) found PEAD to be much stronger when the earnings 
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announcements occured on days with many competing announcements. For high-news 
days, the interdecile spread of the 60-day cumulative abnormal returns between high and 
low earnings surprise firms was found to be 7.2%, whereas for low-news days the same 
spread was only 2.7%. Further analysis made by the researchers showed that PEAD is 
stronger for high-news days also after controlling for other possible determinants of the 
drift. Moreover, they observed that also the abnormal trading volume response to earnings 
was significantly weaker when the earnings announcement occured on a high-news day. 
These results provide strongly supportive evidence for the presented investor distraction 
hypothesis. 
Dellavigna and Pollet (2009), in turn, examined the effects of limited attention on PEAD by 
comparing stock market reactions to earnings announcements occuring on Fridays to those 
occurring on other weekdays. The rationale behind the study was that if investors are 
distracted by the weekends as assumed, the initial reaction to Friday earnings surprises 
should be less pronounced. In addition, as the information content of the announcements 
should eventually be absorbed into the stock prices, the delayed price response (PEAD) 
should be of greater magnitude for the Friday announcements.  
Taking advantage of U.S. data ranging from 1995 to 2006, Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) 
found that the immidiate stock price response was on average 15% lower for Friday 
announcements than for the announcements occurring on other weekdays. In addition, 
the delayed price response was found to be 60% and 40% of the total price response for 
Friday and non-Friday announcements, respectively. These results imply that investors 
indeed are distracted by weekends (in addition to other earnings announcements), which 
in turn suggests intraday variation in market efficiency. This study also further adds to the 
previous results regarding the weekend effect anomaly (see e.g. French 1980; Keim & 
Stambaugh 1984; Schwert 1990). 
In guiding the seemingly roaming attention of the investors, analysts and management 
seem to have an important role. Drawing on a sample of US firms from 1996 to 2002, Zhang 
(2008) found out that if analysts revised their earnings expectations for the next quarter 
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within two days after the current earnings announcement, the current PEAD was diluted 
compared to firms for which the forecast revisions took a longer time. These results suggest 
that with responsive analysts, the market reaction happens more immidiately after the 
earnings announcement while the delayed price reaction is decreased (Zhang 2008). Vice 
cersa, Doyle et al. (2006) documented that extreme PEAD seems to go hand in hand with 
high analyst forecasts dispersion, implying that the investors simply do not have the time 
or the necessary abilities to make up their minds about the “right” analyst forecast on 
which to base their investment decisions. Further, they also documented the drift to be 
stronger when the analyst coverage was lower (Doyle et al. 2006). 
In addition to the analysts’ forecasts, Zhang (2012) notes that also many managers release 
a forecast of next quarter’s earnings at the same time they report the current earnings. As 
these bundled announcements have become more popular in recent years, he adds, it is 
relevant to examine also their effect on PEAD. With a sample of US firms from 1997 to 
2007, Zhang (2012, see also Li & Tse 2008; Wang 2008) showed that PEAD over the next 
quarter is greatly reduced when market participants correctly expect the accuracy of 
manager’s ex ante forecast and base their investment decisions on that.  
Another outcome of the limited attention aspect is that when collecting information, 
investors will primarily concentrate on the information that is readily available. This in turn 
implies that the “bottom lines” of the financial statements are more important than the 
notes or information reported elsewhere in the financial statements (Scott 2015). 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) note that there actually is intense concern as to the form of 
disclosure, even when the information content of the alternative formats is identical. 
Inattention seems foolish in their setting, as it was found by the researchers that investors 
in general lose money by ignoring certain aspects of the economic environment. However, 
they add, as time and attention are costly, such behaviour may be viewed as reasonable.  
Ahmed et al. (2006) have further provided empirical support on this matter as they studied 
a sample of U.S. banks disclosing derivatives as supplementary information prior to the 
1998 SFAS 133 standard, and valued them at fair value in their financial statements proper 
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subsequently to make a comparison regarding the value relevance and the subsequent 
market effect. They found no significant share price reactions when the derivatives were 
disclosed as supplementary information, but a significantly positive reaction when the 
derivatives were disclosed at fair value in the balance sheet. This result strongly contradicts 
with the efficient market theory suggesting that the location of the information is 
irrelevant. Furthermore, it underlines the concern about the form of the disclosure pointed 
out by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). 
These results together add to the somewhat ironic fact that more public information may 
sometimes lead to less efficient markets, while the location and form of the information 
also seem to affect the investors’ beliefs. Richardson et al. (2010) point out that the role of 
information on PEAD is indeed two-folded: previous literature (see e.g. Kimbrough 2005; 
Levi 2008) finds that the anomaly is weaker when there is more detailed information 
available about the earnings release but, on the contrary, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009) find 
(as described) that the anomaly is more pronounced when there is more earnings 
information provided to investors at the same time. This suggests that investors appreciate 
more detailed information to a certain extent, but can only handle so much when multiple 
sources of such detailed information are available. 
Gerard (2012) adds to this that although prior studies have focused on the earnings 
surprise, it should be noted that important non-earnings information is also released at the 
time of the announcements. This information can occur in the form of conference calls or 
press releases, while the different components of earnings (e.g. sales and operating 
margins) also include relevant knowledge. Therefore, to the extent that the abnormal 
returns capture different earnings and non-earnings related news, it can be argued that 
they are a broader measure of market surprise than the traditional proxies. (Gerard 2012).  
Because the relevant information is scattered and the investors’ attention remains limited 
and distracted, the role of the analysts and management in the modern financial markets 
shall not be overlooked as they seemingly are able to act as a link between the investors 
and the sources of the financial information. The results described above also underline 
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the responsibility of analysts and management, as investors do seem to listen and base 
their decisions on the information provided by them. By acting timely, analysts and 
management can drive the information to be absorbed into the stock prices faster, causing 
PEAD to be diluted. Vice versa, these empirical results create an incentive for the 
management to hide bad news by announcing them during periods when the markets’ 
attention is low or the level of investors’ distraction is high. Similarly, they are able to 
highlight good news by announcing them during periods of few other earnings 
announcements (see e.g. deHaan, Shevlin & Thornock 2015).  
All in all, the fact that investors have to selectively allocate their time and cognitive 
resources seems to provide a plausible explanation for the initial market underreacton and 
the subsequently occurring PEAD. Investors in general do face a cost/benefit -tradeoff 
regarding what information to acquire and thus, some investors remain more informed 
than others. This heterogeneity regarding the possessed information, i.e. the level of 
investor sophistication, evidently provides at least a partial explanation for the qualitatively 
quite different RW and AF drifts. However, the proxies used for investor sophistication 
remain somewhat imperfect. At the same time, complete information of the markets 
remains impossibly gathered and more remains known of some companies than others.  
To conclude, the reason for the existence of PEAD still remains heavily debated despite 
having been extensively researched since its discovery about 50 years ago. As prior 
research is able to offer little support for the risk-based explanation or potential flaws in 
research design (Gerard 2012), more recent U.S. evidence seems to be more consistent 
with the market inefficiency explanation (Zhang 2012). Gerard (2012) further notes that 
the current belief for PEAD is that it is indeed caused by some form of underreaction to the 
earnings announcement information but that the exact nature of the underreaction 
remains vague. 
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2.4. Evidence outside the U.S. 
Turning to international evidence, Barber et al. (2013) have examined the existence of 
PEAD in 46 countries (excluding the U.S.) using the annual earnings announcements from 
1991 to 2010. They estimated that the average monthly raw return to a strategy of 
investing in a portfolio of stocks expected to announce earnings during the month and 
shorting an equal dollar amount of a portfolio of expected non-announcers is 7.2% p.a. It 
should be noted that this kind of porfolio is not constructed based on the magnitude of the 
previous earnings surprises (as in most of the previous studies), but is simply formed based 
on whether the firm in question is expected to release their earnings during the month or 
not.  
According to Barber et al. (2013), an investment in the long porfolio offset by a similar 
position in the short porfolio would have yielded 314% in the period from 1991 to 2010, 
whereas a investment in a global portfolio, equally weighted by country, would have 
yielded 264% in the same period. In addition, the long-short portfolio had a 40% greater 
Sharpe ratio than the global portfolio. The researchers also point out, similarly to Scott 
(2015), that the amount of capital deployed to exploit PEAD in global markets might be less 
than for other anomalies, since the portfolio is hereby limited to those firms expected to 
release earnings during the month in question.  
Among the other main findings of Barber et al. (2013) are that a major part of the premium 
is realized prior to (rather than after) the earnings announcement and that the higher pre-
announcement returns are accompanied by reduced volume. In addition, they find that the 
level of idiosyncratic volatility spikes in the three days centered on the announcement date. 
They also extended their analysis to interim announcements, among which they did not 
find “any reliable evidence of a premium” in contrast to the annual announcements. To 
explain these results, the researchers show that the level of abnormal idiosyncratic 
volatility around the interim announcements is much smaller compared to that of the 
annual announcements and is only marginally significant. This is in contrast with the 
previous work on the matter (see Frazzini and Lamont 2007), whereby a significant 
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premium for annual announcements as well as interim announcements was found in the 
U.S. (Barber et al. 2013).  
Booth et al. (1996) provide interesting evidence of PEAD from the Finnish perspective. Their 
purpose was to find out whether the behaviour of the post-announcement returns differs 
between firms who naturally smooth and do not smooth their income in Finland. The 
results of the study suggest that the PEAD is stronger for firms with positive earnings 
surprise compared to those with negative earnings surprise (consistent with U.S. evidence), 
and that most of the return difference is due to the market reaction to the earnings 
surprises of the firms that do not have smoothened income series. The researchers suggest 
that hence, at least a part of the PEAD in Finland can be explained by information 
processing costs.  
Adding to that study, Booth et al. (1997) also examined the role of different income levels 
as the drivers of PEAD in Finland. They reason that as the Finnish accounting practices allow 
the firms to manage their earnings in different ways (mainly for tax purposes), income 
levels other than reported earnings might also contain value relevant information for 
investors. The results of the study show that the net profit in the income statement based 
on Finnish bookkeeping legislation cannot explain the PEAD, but several different income 
measures are important in generating post-announcement abnormal returns. The 
researchers also point out that generalizations for the PEAD studies from one market to 
another should be carried out cautiously due to the different accounting systems in 
different countries.  
Further, leaning on the argument that usually emerging markets are seen as less efficient 
than developed markets, Griffin et al. (2010) studied the role and magnitude of PEAD in 
emerging stock markets taking advantage from stock data between 1994-2005. They found 
that the anomaly was present in 15 of 38 stock markets for which they had announcement 
data and that the abnormal returns associated were not larger in emerging markets when 
measured on a relative scale. More precisely, in the six moths following the earnings 
announcements, they found that the GN stocks earned 1.6% above the market return in 
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developed countries and 5.1% above market in emerging markets. BN stocks were found 
to earn -2.5% and 0.9% compared to market return in developed and emerging markets, 
respectively. Thus, the high minus low PEAD for six months was 4.1% in developed markets 
and 4.2% in emerging markets. Griffin et al. (2010) conclude that even though there are 
notable absolute differences between the returns, a trading strategy aiming to exploit the 
anomaly as a whole would have yielded returns of similar magnitude in developed and 
emerging markets. 
In addition, Gerard (2012) studied the PEAD in Europe with a sample consisting of stocks 
listed in FTSE All-World Developed Europe Index from 1997 to 2010. In line with previous 
U.S. studies, they found that the abnormal returns around the earnings announcement 
were positively related with future returns. Firms with positive surprise in one quarter were 
found to surprise the market in the same direction up to one year after the announcement. 
Further, he demonstrated that stocks with high abnormal volume around the earnings 
announcements outperformed low abnormal volume stocks for up to 90 days after the 
announcement. In addition, it was showed that the anomaly generated larger premiums 
especially when information uncertainty was larger. The abnormal return and the abnormal 
volume effect were both found to be stronger within stocks that experience highest levels 
of idiosyncratic volatility.  
More originally, Liu et al. (2003) examined the PEAD in UK stock markets, based on the 
preliminary evidence (see Hew et al. 1996) considering London Stock Exchange. Using data 
ranging from 1988 to 1998, the main finding of Liu et al. (2003) was that whatever the 
measure of earnings surprise (RW or AF surprise) used, there is significant evidence of post-
announcement abnormal returns in the UK. They also find evidence supporting the 
previous results from U.S. that markets generally “fail to realize the full implications of 
current earnings for future earnings” and that the drift following earnings announcements 
“occurs disproportionately around the next earnings announcement” The researchers 
further add that a market inefficiency replicated in more than one country unambiguously 
points to a systematic failure in the way the markets are processing the information and 
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that “the PEAD phenomenon constitutes a clear rejection of efficient market hypothesis”. 
(Liu et al. 2003). 
2.5. Implications 
As discussed in the prevoius sections, the PEAD anomaly is not something that can be 
overlooked or underestimated from either theoretical or practical viewpoints. Scott (2015) 
further emphasizes the fact that it is important to note the significance of this anomaly, 
because due to its existence, sophisticated market parcitipants can earn arbitrage profits 
by modifying a diversified investments strategy. The resulting investment strategy simply 
includes buying good news stocks and selling short bad news stocks on the day the earnings 
are announced. If these two kinds of stocks and the subsequent returns of these stocks 
were perfectly uncorrelated, the combined portfolio constructed this way would be riskless 
as all price changes other than those arising from PEAD would be cancelled out. Thus, the 
investor would earn a riskless arbitrage profit as the value of the good news (bad news) 
stocks drifts upward (downward) over the following day/weeks/quarters. Scott (2015) 
further notes that proceeds from the short sales could be used to buy more good news 
shares (among which the serial correlation in subsequent quarters is strongest), so little if 
any capital is initially required. 
In previous studies, porfolio constructions like these are very common to prove the 
practical significance of PEAD. There is lots of evidence that this kind of strategy, with minor 
modifications depending on the particular study, would indeed have resulted in arbitage 
profits. Originally, drawing on US data from 1974 to 1986, Bernard & Thomas (1989) 
documented that following a strategy similar to what was just described (based on RW 
surprises) and holding on to the stocks for 60 days, an investor would have earned an 
average return of 18% p.a. above the market return, before transaction costs. More recent 
studies have been able to regenerate these results with varying degrees of success. 
Complementing these results, Doyle et al. (2006) reported a hedge portfolio return of 14% 
in the year following the earnings announcements and 20% over the following two years. 
Their portfolio took a long position in the top decile of AF surprises and a short position in 
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the bottom decile of AF surprises, and their results held even after controlling for risk (as 
measured by beta, size and book-to-market ratio) and other market anomalies. 
Interestingly, they also report a combined portfolio strategy whereby intersecting the PEAD 
strategy with an accruals strategy roughly doubles the returns while also greatly reducing 
the number of stocks in the portfolio. 
Narayanamoorthy (2006) further argues that the positive serial correlation between 
current and following quarters’ seasonal earnings changes will essentially be higher for 
good news firms than for bad news firms. This results from the fact that when conservative 
accounting policies are in use, at least some of the bad news is caused by writedowns 
effecting the net income. This, in turn, will force future reported earnings upwards, as for 
example a writedown of plant and equipment reduces future depreciation and 
amortization costs. For these firms, an increase in future earnings consequently works 
against the positive serial corrrelation of current and future seasonal earnings changes, 
which is at the heart of PEAD (Scott 2015). Further argued by Narayanamoorthy (2006), the 
good news firms have less likely suffered from conservative writedowns, so there should 
be more profits to be made from investing only in good news firms (given PEAD exists). 
Indeed, she was able to construct a porftolio yeilding even more than the market return + 
18% p.a. obtained by Bernard and Thomas (1989). 
Contradictory evidence to the matter is provided by NG et al. (2008), as they studied the 
effect of transaction costs on the PEAD strategy returns with a large U.S. sample ranging 
from 1988 to 2005. They measured the transaction costs as the sum of bid-ask spread and 
commissions and found that when taking a long position on the GN stocks and a short 
position on the BN stocks, the abnormal returns for three months were actually negative 
after deducting the applicable transaction costs. When holding the positions for 12 months, 
the returns were not necessarily negative but still insignificantly different from zero. They 
also found that the magnitude of PEAD was strongly related to the amount of the 
transaction costs, as the stocks with highest transaction costs faced the strongest PEAD. 
Supporting evidence for this result was also found by Doyle et al. (2006), as they similarly 
documented the abnormal returns to be highest when the transaction costs were highest. 
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However, neither these nor the above described studies took a stand on whether a more 
short-term PEAD strategy would have, net of cost, resulted in arbitrage profits. 
To conclude, there is mixed evidence regarding the question of whether investors could 
have in practice benefitted from the PEAD anomaly. Scott (2015) notes that as the arbitrage 
strategies in general include lots of buying, selling and short selling of stocks, investors 
exploiting these kinds of strategies face high brokerage costs compared to other market 
strategies. If the particular stocks that are traded are illiquid, the stock price may rise upon 
buying and fall from short selling, creating an additional cost together with the possible 
bid-ask spread. In addition, time and effort is required to initially develop the necessary 
expertise as well as to continuously monitor the market, which further creates expenses at 
least in form of opportunity costs. (Scott 2015). Indeed, Richardson et al. (2010), using more 
comprehensive measures of transaction costs, have reported that strategies aiming to 
exploit the PEAD as well as the accruals anomaly yielded essentially zero returns (net of 
cost) during the period 2003-2008. For further studies verging on the matter, the 
determination of the applicable transaction costs (especially for a large sample of stocks) 
remains a challenge. 
These results in general suggests that the existence of transaction costs at least partially 
prevents the investors from exploiting the PEAD anomaly at full potential and that “the 
highest amounts of money left on the table are for firms where the money machine is most 
costly to access” (Scott 2015). These findings further relate to the work on informationally 
efficient market by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Fama (1991) and Jensen (1978), as it is 
suggested by them that rational investors are willing to arbitrage the market anomalies 
away only to the extent where the marginal costs do not exceed the marginal benefits. This 
leads to the conclusion that, in the presence of transaction costs, the PEAD anomaly is here 
to stay. Whether there are real-life profits to be made by exploiting such an arbitrage 
strategy is, however, still an alluring question for the practitioners to verge on.   
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3. Hypothesis development 
Based on the previous research information vastly described in section 2, as well as on the 
persistence of the anomaly among different samples in different time periods, there is no 
reason to assume that PEAD would not be present also in this particular sample and in this 
particular time. The first hypothesis of this study is thus constructed as follows:  
H1: Statistically significant PEAD does exist in the European stock markets in 2018 
To prove the statistical significance of the anomaly, the significance of the average 
abnormal returns (AARs) as well as the significance of the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) is tested with Adjusted Patell Z-test. The methodology for significance 
testing is further described in section 4.1.3. 
According to Garfinkel & Sokobin (2006), a common result ducumented in prior work 
regarding PEAD is that the anomaly is concentrated among smaller firms, implying potential 
selection bias concerns in tests requiring data typically available only for larger firms. 
Indeed, already Foster et al. (1984) have concluded that the absolute magnitude of PEAD 
is inversely related to firm size. Complementing this view with international evidence, 
Barber et al. (2013) found the PEAD to be more pronounced for the smallest stocks. In 
addition, the work by Bhushan (1994) showed that the concentration of PEAD among these 
smaller firms is likely associated with the difficulty they present in trading to take advantage 
of the mispricing, as the transaction costs are higher for smaller firms driving the sensitivity 
of PEAD to firm size. Moreover, Doyle et al. (2006) found that when the PEAD is measured 
based on the AF surprise, the large and persistent abnormal returns are not concentrated 
in a few industries and that firms with extreme earnings surprise are generally smaller than 
the average firm. 
According to this prior information, the second and third hypothesis for this study are as 
follows: 
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H2a: Firm size is inversely related to the magnitude of PEAD 
H2b: Firm size is inversely related to the length of PEAD 
H3a: The economic sector has no effect on the magnitude of PEAD 
H3b: The economic sector has no effect on the length of PEAD 
The magnitude of PEAD refers to the amount the realized cumulative returns differ from 
the expected cumulative returns, i.e. to the intrinsic value of the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR). The length of PEAD refers to the count of the consecutive days from the 
event date onwards that the abnormal returns stay positive or negative. Detailed 
information regarding these definitions shall be found in section 4.2. 
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4. Empirical methods 
The empirical part of this study is divided in two based on the two distinct research 
questions. This chapter aims to describe the harnessed empirical methods (event study and 
OLS regression) to create a firm ground for the subsequent analyses. The reader is walked 
through the timeline of the event study, the determination of the abnormal returns, the 
deployment of the significance test as well as the models and variables regarding the 
regression analysis. 
4.1. Event study 
The event study methodology is a widely used procedure in finance and economics, 
developed to measure the impact of a specific event on asset price behavior and on the 
value of a firm (MacKinlay 1997). Binder (1998) notes that the methodology is often 
attributed to Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), who examined the effect of stock splits 
on the subsequent stock returns using this method. He adds that since then, the event 
study methodology has been widely used to examine asset price behavior around events 
such as mergers and acquisitions, issues of new debt or equity, accounting rule changes, 
changes in the severity of regulation and publishing of earnings announcements. Put 
simply, it has become the standard in measuring asset price reactions to an announcement 
or event (Binder 1998).  
An event study in general can be viewed as a three-step process. First, the applicable 
timeframe for the study needs to be determined. This includes defining the lengths of the 
estimation window and event window as well as specifying the actual event date. In 
addition, a post-event window can be determined for additional analysis.  
Second, as the abnormal returns during the event window are often the main focus in event 
studies, the underlying benchmark model for normal (expected) returns is to be 
determined. Brown and Warner (1980) note that the abnormal returns are always viewed 
as abnormal relative to a certain benchmark, so the determination of the underlying 
normal return model has a straight impact on the subsequent abnormal returns. Moreover, 
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in sample studies such as this, the average and cumulative measures of abnormal returns 
are often further calculated to catch a glimpse on the trends the sample is generating.  
Third, the significance of the abnormal returns needs to be tested to separate the abnormal 
returns generated by chance from the abnormal returns generated by the event (i.e. 
earnings announcement) in question. These three aspects of the event study process are 
further viewed and described in the following sections. 
4.1.1. Estimation and event windows 
Chart 1a. General timeline for an event study 
 
Chart 1a represents a general timeline for an event study. The area between t0 and t1 is 
called the estimation window, during which a particular model is used to determine the 
normal (expected) returns for a stock in question. The area between t1 and t0 is the event 
window, during which the actual occurred returns are compared to the normal returns 
derived from the estimation window to determine the abnormal returns, Day 0 being the 
actual event date. The area between t2 and t3 is the post-event window, which is mostly 
used in long-term event studies but is of no interest regarding this particular study. 
First, McKinlay (1997) points out that there is no single rule on the length of the estimation 
and event windows. The most common way is to use the period prior to the event window 
for the estimation window and generally, the event window itself is excluded from the 
estimation window to prevent the event from affecting the normal performance model 
parameter estimates (MacKinlay 1997). The challenge to solve in determining the length of 
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the estimation window is to find balance in the tradeoff between improved estimation 
accuracy and potential parameter shifts. Longer estimation windows improve accuracy, as 
they imply larger samples of returns, but they also bear the risk of covering structural 
breaks (e.g. due to confounding events) of the α and β factors, which will then lead to 
biased estimators. (Eventstudytools 2018a). However, Armitage (1995) and more recently 
Park (2004) found that the results are not sensitive to varying estimation window lenghts 
as long as the length of the estimation window exceeds 100 days.  
With the event window, there exists a similar challenge as it needs to be specified over 
which period the studied event will have an impact on the respective stock. On one hand, 
information leakage and longer information processing periods favor longer event 
windows, and on the other hand, confounding events suggest shorter event windows. 
(Eventstudytools 2018a). Scott (2015) further points out that there exists a determination 
issue between causation and association regarding the narrow and wide window event 
studies. Keeping the event window narrow, it can be argued that the market reaction is 
caused by the accounting information released. For wide window studies, the most that 
can be argued is that the earnings and returns are associated. This is because much of the 
information in earnings releases is already built into stock prices by the time the earnings 
are announced, as the earnings announcements are not the only source of information for 
investors. (Scott 2015). In their original study, Ball and Brown (1968) estimated that so 
much as 85 - 90% of the earnings information was indeed already absorbed into the stock 
prices at the time the current earnings were announced. Nevertheless, Scott (2015) adds, 
the important point hereby is that the markets are unable to anticipate all the information 
in earnings releases, which underlines the usefulness of the narrow window studies. 
Leaning on the arguments above, the length of the event window for this study is chosen 
to be 20 days, centering symmetrically to the event date. This (rather short) window is 
justified to prevent the event window from including confounding events but at the same 
time allowing it to capture the effects of an earnings announcement on stock behaviour in 
more than just a few days. Furthermore, the length of the estimation window for this study 
is chosen to be 120 days, ending to day -11 (one day before the starting of the event 
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window) relative to the event date. By doing so, the arguments of Armitage (1995) and 
Park (2004) described above are also taken into consideration. As a result, the timeline for 
this study is as follows: 
Chart 1b. Timeline for this event study 
 
The days determined are expressed relative to the event date, while t3 remains unspecified 
as it was noted that the post-event window is of no interest regarding this particular study. 
4.1.2. Normal and abnormal returns 
As mentioned, the appraisal of the event’s impact requires measuring the abnormal 
returns in the event window. Abnormal returns in event studies are defined as the actual 
returns of the security over the event window minus the normal (expected) returns of the 
firm over the event window (MacKinlay 1997): 
ARi,t  =  Ri,t – E(Ri,t)                                                                              (3) 
where 
ARi,t      =  abnormal return for stock i in time period t 
Ri,t           =  actual return for stock i in time period t 
E(Ri,t) =  normal (expected) return for stock i in time period t 
 
 
37 
 
As a security’s price performance can only be considered abnormal relative to a particular 
benchmark, it is necessary to first specify a model generating the normal (expected) returns 
for the specific security in question (Brown & Warner 1980). The normal return is defined 
as the expected return without conditioning on the event taking place (MacKinlay 1997) 
and there are several ways to determine it. Following the categorization and examples of 
Brown and Warner (1980), Binder (1998) and Eventstudytools (2018a), hereby presented 
are the three most general models used in generating the ex ante normal (expected) 
returns: 
Mean Adjusted model 
The Mean Adjusted model assumes that the normal return for a stock i in period t is equal 
to the average return of that stock during the estimation window: 
E(Ri,t)  =  ?̂?i                                 (4) 
where              
 ?̂?i   =   the average return of stock i during the estimation window    
The abnormal return for stock i in time period t is subsequently determined as the actual 
return for the stock in time period t minus the average return of that stock during the 
estimation window: 
ARi,t   =  Ri,t -  ?̂?i                             (5) 
Under this model, the length of the estimation window will obviously have an impact on 
the magnitude of the observed abnormal returns, because the average of the returns may 
very well change as the length of the estimation window varies. In addition, Binder (1998) 
notes that this method does not explicitly control for the risk of the stock or the return on 
the market portfolio. However, he adds, it might be slighlty simpler than the other models 
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presented because only one parameter is to be estimated and no market returns are 
needed in the model. Under the assumption that a security has constant systematic risk 
and that the efficient frontier is stationary, this model is also consistent with the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (Brown & Warner 1980). 
Market Adjusted model 
Market Adjusted model assumes that the normal return for stock i in period t equals the 
reference market return in period t: 
E(Ri,t)  =  Rm,t                                                                                                                            (6) 
where 
Rm,t    =  the actual reference market return in time period t 
The abnormal return for stock i in time period t is subsequently determined as the actual 
return for the stock in time period t minus the reference market return in time period t: 
ARi,t   =  Ri,t – Rm,t                                                   (7) 
When the Market Adjusted model is used, no parameters need to be estimated and only 
the reference market return determines the abnormal component in a particular stock’s 
return in time period t (Binder 1998). Using the actual market return is maybe the simplest 
way to control for potential effects of the event on the general market, however the model 
does not adjust for basic CAPM risk and thus abstracts from the firm’s distinct systematic 
risk profile (Eventstudytools 2018a). Brown and Warner (1980) further point out that the 
model implicitly assumes that the normal (expected) return is equal across all securities, as 
long as the time period t is constant and the reference market is equal. They continue that 
if all securities have systematic risk of unity, this model is consistent with the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. 
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Furthermore, modifications to the Market Adjusted model are also possible: Instead of 
referring to the market returns, researchers may as well turn to the performance of a 
comparable firm’s stock when seeking a proxy for a distinct firm’s normal returns. Thereby, 
one replaces the market return from the above equation with the returns of a comparable 
firm’s stock. (Eventstudytools 2018a). 
Market model 
The Market model, in turn, builds on the actual returns of a reference market and the 
correlation of the firm's stock with the reference market. In the market model, it is assumed 
that the normal (expected) returns follow a single factor market model including two 
inputs: the typical relationship between the firm's stock and its reference index (expressed 
by α and β parameters) and the actual reference market return (Rm,t). The normal 
(expected) returns are subsequently determined as follows: 
E(Ri,t)   =  αi + βiRm,t + ɛi,t                                                                        (8) 
where αi    =  intercept term βi    =  regression coefficient (beta), a measure of the sensitivity of Ri,t on the reference 
market ɛi,t    =  error term with E(ɛi,t) = 0 and finite variance, uncorrelated to the market return Rm,t  
and firm return Rj,t with i ≠ j, not autocorrelated and homoskedastic 
The abnormal return for stock i in time period t is subsequently determined as the 
difference between the actual stock return in time period t and the normal return:  
ARi,t  =  Ri,t – (αi + βiRm,t)                                                            (9) 
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Binder (1998) notes that the market model approach is quite straight-forward and 
relatively easy to use, as the parameters are estimated using a pre-event period sample 
with OLS regressions. The parameter estimates and the event period stock and market 
index returns are subsequently used to estimate the abnormal returns. This method also 
controls for the risk (via the market factor beta) of the stock and the movement of the 
market during the event period. (Binder 1998). 
Considering the usage of these three different models in determining the normal 
(expected) returns, the Market model is found to be the most common practice. Of a 
sample of 400 event studies, 3.3% were found to draw on the Mean Adjusted model, 13.3% 
used the Market Adjusted model and a majority of 79.1% deployed the Market model. 
(Eventstudytools 2018a, see Holler 2014). In addition to these three main models, there 
are also several other models used in determining the normal (expected) returns. These 
models include the Market model with Scholes-Williams beta estimation, Market model 
with GARCH and EGARCH error estimations, CAPM model, Fama-French 3-factor model and 
Fama-French Momentum 4-factor model (Eventstudytools 2018a). Addressing these 
further models in detail is however beyond the scope of this study.  
In this study, the Market model is utilized to determine the normal (expected) returns 
because it is widely accepted as the standard model, is relatively easy to use and is able to 
account for systematic risk via the beta factor. It is however not completely free from 
criticism, as it for example assumes that the risk-free interest rate included in the α factor 
is constant, which in turn conflicts with the presumption that market returns vary over time 
(Eventstudytools 2018a). As the Market model requires market returns (Rm,t) for 
calculating the normal (expected) returns for stock i, STOXX Europe 600 is chosen as the 
reference market index for this study. With a fixed number of 600 components, it 
represents large, mid and small capitalization companies across 17 countries of the 
European region including companies for example from France, Germany, Sweden, Finland, 
Netherlands and Spain (Stoxx 2018). 
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Average and cumulative abnormal measures 
Furthermore, an analysis performed for multiple events of the same event type (such as 
this study) may yield typical stock market response patterns regarding the event type in 
question (Eventstudytools 2018b). To broaden the view outside the abnormal returns of a 
single stock on a single day in the event window, it is useful to introduce the concepts of 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAARs). 
Average abnormal returns are calculated from the sample as follows: 𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 1𝑁 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖=1 i,t                                                                                                                   (10) 
By calculating the average abnormal returns, it can be concluded how the sample stocks 
on average behave on a single day in the event window. To measure the total impact of an 
event over the event window, individual abnormal returns can be added up to create 
cumulative abnormal returns: 
CAR(t1, t2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡2𝑡=𝑡1 i,t                                                                                                                                                           (11) 
By calculating the cumulative abnormal returns, conclusions can be made of how a single 
stock behaves between different time points in the event window. In a sample event study 
that holds multiple observations of individual event types (e.g. earnings announcements), 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) can be further calculated. They represent 
the mean values of identical events:  
CAAR  = 1𝑛 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑛𝑖=1 (t1,t2)                                                                                                 (12) 
By calculating the cumulative average abnormal returns, the average behavior of the 
sample stocks between different time points in the event window is clarified. In sum, the 
abnormal returns (ARs) as well as the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are useful in 
determining how the returns of a single stock behave in the event window, whereas the 
average abnormal returns (AARs) and the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
are of more use in specifying how the returns of all the sample stocks on average behave.  
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4.1.3. Significance testing 
To test the significance of the AARs and CAARs, this study takes advantage of the Adjusted 
Patell Z -test, which is a parametric statistical test developed by Kolari & Pynnönen (2010). 
Their determination of the test statistic relies on the original Patell Z-test (also referred to 
as the Standardized Residual Test), first introduced by Patell (1976). The basic logic behind 
the original Patell Z-test is to first standardize the firm-specific abnormal returns with 
forecast-error corrected standard deviation:  
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                  (13) 
where 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡   =   standardized abnormal returns for firm i in time period t 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡      =   abnormal returns for firm i in time period t 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡      =   forecast-error corrected standard deviation of ARi,t 
The test statistic for testing H0: AAR = 0 is subsequently calculated as: 
𝑍𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙,𝑡 =   𝐴𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑆𝐴𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡                                                                                                                                                                    (14) 
where 
𝐴𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡     =   the sum over the sample of the standardized abnormal returns,  ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑖=1   𝑆𝐴𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡      =  the forecast-error corrected standard deviation of ASARt 
To further test the significance of the cumulative average abnormal returns, the test 
statistic for H0: CAAR = 0 is obtained as: 
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𝑍𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙 =  1√𝑁 ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑆𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑁𝑖=1                                                                                                   (15) 
where 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  the cumulative standardized abnormal returns, 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑇2𝑡=𝑇1+1  𝑆𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖   =  the forecast-error corrected standard deviation for CSARi 
Regarding the flaws of the original Patell Z-test, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) point out that 
event studies in general are often subject to cross-sectional correlation among abnormal 
returns, especially when the sample firms have the same event date. Because of this, the 
test statistic used to measure the significance of abnormal returns cannot implicitly assume 
that the abnormal returns are independent. The authors found out that even when the 
cross-correlation among the abnormal returns is low, the clustering event dates lead to a 
serious possibility of over-rejecting the null hypothesis of zero AARs when it is true. (Kolari 
& Pynnönen 2010). 
Because of the described possibility with the original Patell Z-test to view the abnormal 
returns as statistically significant even though they are not, Kolari & Pynnönen (2010) 
suggest an improved test statistic taking into account the cross-correlation of abnormal 
returns as well as their inflation of event date variance. They also point out that the 
developed test statistic is the only parametric method that robustly corrects the clustering 
issues and that the test statistic further dominates nonparametric tests when testing CARs. 
This method is referred to as the Adjusted Patell Z-test, and is utilized in this study to avoid 
the over-rejection of H0: AAR = CAAR = 0 caused by the possible cross-correlation of the 
abnormal returns.  
The test statistic for H0: AAR = 0 for the Adjusted Patell Z-test is defined as follows: 
ZAdjPatell,t   =  ZPatell,t √ 11+(𝑁−1)?̅?                                                                                                                                            (16) 
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where  
ZPatell,t     =    the original Patell test statistic  ?̅?            =     the average of the sample cross-correlation of the estimation period                                         
kkkkkkkkkkkk abnormal returns 
It is observable from the above equation that if ?̅? equals zero, the adjusted test statistic 
equals the original Patell test statistic. Otherwise, a correction takes place. As the original 
Patell test statistic, also the Adjusted Patell test statistic can be used to measure the 
significance of the cumulative average abnormal returns. The test statistic for H0: CAAR = 0 
is obtained as: 
ZAdjPatell   =  ZPatell √ 11+(𝑁−1)?̅?                                                                                                      (17)                     
4.2. OLS regression 
4.2.1. Model 1 
The firm-specific intrinsic values of the CARs as well as the lengths of the drift from the 
event date onwards, both obtained from the event study phase, are further explained with 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. The effect of company’s size on the 
dependent variables is measured with one independent variable, while the effect of the 
industry sector on the dependent variables is measured with ten dummy variables. The 
regression analysis is conducted to answer the main research question (Question 2). 
The first and a general regression model (Model 1) is constructed as follows: 
│CAR(t1, t2)i │= β0 + β1logMarketCapi + β2ITi  + β3ConsumerDiscretionaryi + β4HealthCarei  +  β5Financialsi  +  β6CommunicationServicesi  +  β7Materialsi  + β8RealEstatei + β9ConsumerStaplesi  +  β10Utilitiesi  +  β11Energyi  +  ɛi                      (18) 
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where  
│CAR(t1, t2)i │   =    intrinsic value of the cumulative abnormal returns for firm i's stock 
from t1 to t2 β0                            =     intercept term 
logMarketCapi  =  natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm i at 
31.12.2017. A logarithmic transformation is conducted to assume a linear relationship in 
the model. 
ITi, ConsumerDiscretionaryi, HealthCarei, Financialsi, CommunicationServicesi, 
Materialsi,  RealEstatei, ConsumerStaplesi, Utilitiesi and Energyi  =  binary dummy 
variables ɛi                            =    general error term with E(ɛ) = 0 
The dummy variables in the model are based on the GICS Economic Sector classification. 
The Industrials sector (being the most representative single sector) is left out of the model 
as the reference category to avoid the dummy variable trap. Hence, the intercept β0 will 
capture the effect of Industrials sector in the model and the coefficient estimate for a 
particular dummy variable will tell the difference relative to the Industrials sector.  
The dummy variables in the model are binary, so they get either one of the values 0 and 1 
depending on the sector. For example, if firm i operates in the financial sector, the variable 
Financialsi  gets a value of 1 while all of the other dummy variables get a value of 0, as by 
definiton one firm cannot operate in two sectors at the same time.  
Intrinsic values of the CARs are used in this study because the cumulative abnormal returns’ 
absolute deviation from zero (the magnitude) is of interest hereby, not so much the sign of 
the CARs. Further determining the time points t1 and t2  leads from the general model 
(Model 1) to specified models 1a, 1b and 1c, so that for all of these models the independent 
variables remain as determined but 
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for Model 1a:  t1 = 1, t2 = 2   →  Dependent variable  =  │CAR(1, 2)i │    
for Model 1b:  t1 = 1, t2 = 5   →  Dependent variable  =  │CAR(1, 5)i │    
for Model 1c:  t1 = 1, t2 = 10 →  Dependent variable  =  │CAR(1, 10)i │    
These three specified models are constructed to catch a glimpse on how the independent 
variables affect the CARs between different time points, i.e. how firm size and economic 
sector relate to the two-day drift, five-day drift and ten-day drift. The event date is in all of 
the models 1a, 1b and 1c excluded from the timeframe, as the focus is especially in 
explaining the drift (defined as what happens after the event date) rather than in explaining 
the abnormal returns on the event date.  
4.2.2. Model 2 
Model 2 deviates from Model 1 in the sense that the length of the drift in days from the 
event date onwards is of interest, rather than the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal 
returns. This model is constructed to find out whether the independent variables have an 
effect on the length rather than on the magnitude of the drift.  
Model 2 is subsequently constructed as follows: 
Li = β0 + β1logMarketCapi + β2ITi  + β3ConsumerDiscretionaryi + β4HealthCarei  +  β5Financialsi  +  β6CommunicationServicesi  +  β7Materialsi  + β8RealEstatei + β9ConsumerStaplesi  +  β10Utilitiesi  +  β11Energyi  +  ɛi                                                                                   (19) 
where 
Li = Length of the drift for firm i, measured in days from the event date onwards so that 
if ARi,0  >  0,  ARi,1  <  0 or if ARi,0  <  0,  ARi,1  >  0,  then Li = 0 
if ARi,0  >  0,  ARi,1  >  0 or if  ARi,0  <  0,  ARi,1  <  0, then Li = 1 
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if ARi,0  >  0, ARi,1  >  0 , ARi,2  > 0 or if  ARi,0  <  0, ARi,1  <  0 , ARi,2  < 0, then Li = 2 
if ARi,0  >  0, ARi,1  >  0, ARi,2  > 0, ARi,3  > 0 or if  ARi,0  <  0, ARi,1  <  0, ARi,2  < 0, ARi,3  < 
0, then Li = 3 
. . .  
if ARi,0  >  0, ARi,1  >  0, ARi,2  > 0, ARi,3  > 0, ARi,4  >  0, ARi,5  >  0, ARi,6  > 0, ARi,7  > 0, ARi,8  
>  0, ARi,9  > 0, ARi,10  > 0  or if  ARi,0  <  0, ARi,1  <  0, ARi,2  < 0, ARi,3  < 0, ARi,4  <  0, ARi,5  
<  0, ARi,6  < 0, ARi,7  < 0, ARi,8  <  0, ARi,9  < 0, ARi,10 < 0, then Li = 10 
, Li = 0, 1, 2, 3, … , 10. 
The other variables in Model 2 are defined as in Model 1. 
As a summary of the deployed methodology, the event study is conducted first to find out 
the abnormal returns (ARs) for the individual sample stocks in the event window, based on 
which the firm-specific drift lenghts are calculated. Further, the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) as well as the average abnormal returns (AARs) and the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) in the event window are calculated based on the individual 
abnormal returns (ARs). 
Second, the significance of the AARs and CAARs between different time points is examined 
in order to find answers for the first research question. In addition, the firm-specific CARs 
and drift lengths are explained with the four different regression models described above 
to find answers for the second research question.  
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5. Data 
In this chapter, the data for this study is further reviewed. This includes specifying how the 
sample for this study was selected as well as clarifying the qualities of the sample in the 
form of descriptive statistics. 
5.1. Sample selection 
The data for this study was gathered from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Initially, all 
European and Russian companies excluding UK companies who had published their latest 
financial statement between 1.1.2018 – 30.9.2018 were considered. The companies from 
the UK were excluded from this study as they have gained attention from previous PEAD 
studies and one of the missions of this study was to explore the areas where PEAD has not 
been researched to such a great extent. Creating a subsample like this allowed the 
exploration of the previously unresearched markets more efficiently. Second, the research 
regarding PEAD is generally quite well up to date, so in order to maximize the value of 
contribution, this study focused on the most recent publications of financial statement 
information. Thus, the time period during which the latest financial statement had to be 
published was required to be 1.1.2018 – 30.9.2018.  
Third, the sample companies were further required to have market capitalization at year 
end 2017 (31.12.2017) available. The date was specified as is because the market 
capitalizations at that time were not yet affected by the financial statement information 
released between 1.1.2018 – 30.9.2018. This makes the market capitalizations among the 
sample firms comparable in the sense that the information content released in 2018 cannot 
have for any firm’s part affected the market capitalization at year end 2017.  
Fourth, the sample companies were required to have the CIGS Economic Sector 
classification available. As a result, Datastream was able to provide data from 2219 
companies in Europe (including Russia and excluding the UK).  
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Table 1. Excluded firms 
 
The data imported from Datastream consisted of 2219 firms that met the four initial 
requirements described above. After this, the data was further reviewed to remove the 
blanks and inconsistencies from it. As Table 1 shows, there were 209 firms who had a 
missing value for earnings surprise percentage, measured as the relative surprise between 
the reported earnings in the latest financial statement and the average of all analysts 
forecasts. Earnings surprise percentage was required in order to divide the final sample 
into firms who had in their lates financial statement reported good news (GN) and bad 
news (BN) in relation to what was expected.  
In addition, there were 11 firms in the sample who had a missing value for total assets and 
29 firms whose revenue was zero or missing. Total assets and revenue (both as reported in 
the latest financial statement) were required variables in order to perform a sensitivity 
analysis with size variables other than market capitalization. Furthermore, there were 85 
firms that did not have perfect stock data available between 5.6.2017 – 12.10.2018. Perfect 
stock data for that time period was required in order to meet the lenghts of the estimation 
and event windows.   
FInally, the data was classified based on the magnitude of the earnings surprise percentage 
and 1% of both ends was deleted to preserve the final data from outlier effects. In sum, 
this procedure resulted in 38 firms being deleted from the sample. Consequently, the final 
sample consists of 1847 firms with the following features. 
Firms imported from Datastream 2219
Reason for deleting Deleted Sum after deleting
Earnings surprise percentage missing 209 2010
Total assets missing 11 1999
Revenue 0 or missing 29 1970
Imperfect stock data between 5.6.2017 - 12.10.2018 85 1885
Extreme positive earnings surprise (1%) 19 1866
Extreme negative earnings surprise (1%) 19 1847
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5.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2. Sample divided based on the country of exchange 
 
Table 2 presents the final sample classified based on the firm’s country of exchange. In 
sum, there are firms from 19 different countries included in the sample, the three most 
representative countries in this sense being France, Germany and Sweden, respectively. 
The firms from these three countries consist around a half of the total sample, as the ten 
most representative countries consist a little over 90% of the total sample.  
 
 
 
 
Country of exchange # of firms % of total sample Cumulative # Cumulative %
France 335 18.1 % 335 18.1 %
Germany 299 16.2 % 634 34.3 %
Sweden 294 15.9 % 928 50.2 %
Italy 163 8.8 % 1091 59.1 %
Switzerland 128 6.9 % 1219 66.0 %
Norway 114 6.2 % 1333 72.2 %
Finland 104 5.6 % 1437 77.8 %
Spain 80 4.3 % 1517 82.1 %
Netherlands 79 4.3 % 1596 86.4 %
Poland 71 3.8 % 1667 90.3 %
Belgium 58 3.1 % 1725 93.4 %
Denmark 44 2.4 % 1769 95.8 %
Greece 27 1.5 % 1796 97.2 %
Russia 24 1.3 % 1820 98.5 %
Estonia 9 0.5 % 1829 99.0 %
Hungary 6 0.3 % 1835 99.4 %
Romania 6 0.3 % 1841 99.7 %
Lithuania 5 0.3 % 1846 99.9 %
Latvia 1 0.1 % 1847 100.0 %
1847 100.0 %
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Table 3. Sample divided based on the CIGS Economic Sector 
 
Table 3, in turn, represents the final sample classified based on the GICS Economic sector. 
Altogether there are 11 different sectors represented in the sample, the Industrials sector 
being the largest single sector constituting around one fifth of the total sample. In addition, 
the firms from the four most representative sectors (Industrials, IT, Consumer Discretionary 
and Health Care) form well over 50% of the total sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic Sector No. of firms % of total sample Cumulative No. Cumulative %
Industrials 392 21.2 % 392 21.2 %
Information Technology 235 12.7 % 627 33.9 %
Consumer Discretionary 214 11.6 % 841 45.5 %
Health Care 211 11.4 % 1052 57.0 %
Financials 204 11.0 % 1256 68.0 %
Communication Services 126 6.8 % 1382 74.8 %
Materials 118 6.4 % 1500 81.2 %
Real Estate 113 6.1 % 1613 87.3 %
Consumer Staples 99 5.4 % 1712 92.7 %
Energy 84 4.5 % 1796 97.2 %
Utilities 51 2.8 % 1847 100.0 %
1847 100.0 %
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Table 4. Good news and bad news stocks divided based on country of exchange and GICS economic sector  
 
Table 4 further examines the polarization of the sample stocks into GN (good news) and BN 
(bad news) categories based on the country of exchange and the CIGS Economic Sector 
classification. A stock is considered as a GN stock if the corresponding earnings surprise 
obtained from Datastream is 0.00% or greater. Similarly, a stock is considered as a BN stock 
if the earnings surprise is less than 0.00%. Altogether, this classification results in 851 and 
996 firms forming the GN and BN groups, respectively.  
Regardless of the grouping variable (country or sector), the firms in the sample seem to be 
quite equally distributed into GN and BN categories. If the four most unrepresentative 
countries are left out of the scope, the most unequal distribution among country 
classification can be found among Finnish stocks, of which 60.6% are BN stocks and 39.4% 
GN stocks. Considering the classification based on economic sector, the most unequal 
distribution can be found in Consumer Discretionary sector where 59.3% of the stocks are 
Country of ex. GN % BN % Economic Sector GN % BN %
France 152 45.4 % 183 54.6 % Industrials 187 47.7 % 205 52.3 %
Germany 128 42.8 % 171 57.2 % IT 101 43.0 % 134 57.0 %
Sweden 152 51.7 % 142 48.3 % Cons. Disc. 87 40.7 % 127 59.3 %
Italy 76 46.6 % 87 53.4 % Health Care 86 40.8 % 125 59.2 %
Switzerland 62 48.4 % 66 51.6 % Financials 108 52.9 % 96 47.1 %
Norway 48 42.1 % 66 57.9 % Comm. Services 54 42.9 % 72 57.1 %
Finland 41 39.4 % 63 60.6 % Materials 56 47.5 % 62 52.5 %
Spain 32 40.0 % 48 60.0 % Real Estate 58 51.3 % 55 48.7 %
Netherlands 36 45.6 % 43 54.4 % Cons. Staples 50 50.5 % 49 49.5 %
Poland 33 46.5 % 38 53.5 % Energy 38 45.2 % 46 54.8 %
Belgium 24 41.4 % 34 58.6 % Utilities 26 51.0 % 25 49.0 %
Denmark 23 52.3 % 21 47.7 %
Greece 14 51.9 % 13 48.1 %
Russia 11 45.8 % 13 54.2 %
Estonia 4 44.4 % 5 55.6 %
Hungary 5 83.3 % 1 16.7 %
Romania 5 83.3 % 1 16.7 %
Lithuania 4 80.0 % 1 20.0 %
Latvia 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 %
851 996 851 996
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BN stocks and 40.7% are GN stocks. This classification verifies that no single country or 
sector is overrepresented in either of the BN/GN categories. 
Table 5. Sector-specific descriptive statistics for Market Cap (in millions of €)  
 
Finally, Table 5 provides sector-specific descriptive statistics for market capitalization 
(illustrated in millions of €). These statistics help in gaining sight on how the size variable 
may work through the sector variables in the OLS regression models. If the companies in 
one sector were found to be on average significantly larger (or smaller) than the companies 
in the Industrials (reference) sector and the particular sector dummy was subsequently 
found significant, it would have to be noted that it is the size that causes the possible 
significance of the dummy variable and not the economic sector itself. This table is 
consequently further referred to during the analysis of the regression outputs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic sector Median MC Mean MC Largest MC Smallest MC
Utilities 2,617.93 7,484.70 52,155.07 41.77
Financials 2,274.99 8,486.05 88,409.99 40.73
Materials 1,304.05 5,491.42 84,261.24 1.09
Consumer Staples 1,109.37 10,664.90 223,139.34 8.19
Communication Services 853.80 4,260.29 70,445.78 6.07
Real Estate 831.25 2,058.09 20,967.05 13.14
Industrials 785.17 3,456.83 64,288.15 1.74
Energy 720.01 10,033.76 233,560.89 3.06
Consumer Discretionary 561.80 5,205.98 124,416.19 8.47
Health Care 298.72 4,809.17 183,717.98 2.87
IT 240.74 1,990.45 114,803.72 2.98
Total sample 666.90 5,078.79 233,560.89 1.09
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6. Empirical findings 
This chapter dives into the empirical findings of this study. First, the overall results of the 
event study analysis as well as the results of the OLS regression analysis are reviewed. 
Second, a summary of the results is provided in the end of this chapter along with 
discussion and limitations.  
6.1. Event study 
The final sample for the event study analysis consisted of 996 bad news stocks and 850 
good news stocks, as one stock from the BN category was left out due to the reason that 
the prices (and consequently the returns) of that stock were constant in the estimation 
window (data error in Datastream). To gain a complete understanding of the results, a 
visual illustration of the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) in the event window 
is presented first. Second, further tables concluding the significance tests for the average 
abnormal returns (AARs) and for the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are 
provided. 
Chart 2. Cumulative average abnormal returns in the event window 
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Table 6. Average abnormal returns, cumulative average abnormal returns and the significance test for 
average abnormal returns 
 
 
 
Chart 2 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns in the event window for GN and 
BN stocks, as Table 6 further numerically verifies the visual output of Chart 2. Together they 
provide interesting insight about the PEAD anomaly in ex-UK Europe based on financial 
statement information released in 2018 and suggest answers to the first research question 
of this study. First, it is clearly observable from Chart 2 that published financial information 
does have great value relevance, as both the curves face steep shifts and statistically 
significant abnormal returns (at 1% significance level) on the event date. Second, the PEAD 
anomaly still seems to be present in the stock markets especially among the BN stocks, as 
the negative drift for BN stocks, on average, continues on all days subsequent to the event 
date except on Day 9 (+0,03% return, statistically insignificant).  
Day AAR Adj. Pat. Z Sig. of AAR CAAR AAR Adj. Pat. Z Sig. of AAR CAAR
-10 0.02 % -0.169 0.02 % -0.05 % 0.132 -0.05 %
-9 -0.09 % -0.831 -0.07 % -0.09 % -1.383 -0.14 %
-8 0.01 % -0.248 -0.06 % 0.02 % 0.151 -0.12 %
-7 -0.05 % -0.469 -0.11 % 0.01 % -0.558 -0.11 %
-6 0.20 % 2.993 ** 0.09 % -0.01 % 1.256 -0.12 %
-5 -0.01 % -0.049 0.08 % 0.03 % 1.246 -0.09 %
-4 0.06 % 0.785 0.14 % -0.13 % -0.934 -0.22 %
-3 0.09 % 2.057 * 0.23 % -0.02 % -0.741 -0.24 %
-2 0.15 % 3.217 ** 0.38 % 0.09 % 2.134 * -0.15 %
-1 0.05 % 1.099 0.43 % 0.11 % 2.077 * -0.04 %
0 0.63 % 12.384 ** 1.06 % -0.76 % -15.239 ** -0.80 %
1 0.28 % 7.982 ** 1.34 % -0.25 % -4.465 ** -1.05 %
2 0.10 % 1.958 1.44 % -0.20 % -2.741 ** -1.25 %
3 -0.11 % -1.231 1.33 % -0.08 % -0.505 -1.33 %
4 -0.11 % -2.489 1.22 % -0.05 % -1.677 -1.38 %
5 -0.05 % -0.804 1.17 % -0.14 % -2.007 * -1.52 %
6 -0.05 % -0.320 1.12 % -0.07 % -1.137 -1.59 %
7 -0.07 % -0.947 1.05 % -0.05 % -1.942 -1.64 %
8 -0.06 % -1.233 0.99 % -0.02 % -0.228 -1.66 %
9 0.06 % 2.427 ** 1.05 % 0.03 % -0.649 -1.63 %
10 -0.12 % -2.009 ** 0.93 % -0.04 % -0.502 -1.67 %
*   = significant at 5% significance level
** = significant at 1% significance level 
Good News Bad News
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However, the curve for the GN stocks tells a different story. In line with previous studies, 
the GN stocks do seem to experience statistically significant positive abnormal returns on 
the event date and on Day 1. In addition, they gain statistically insignificant positive 
abnormal returns on Day 2 but after that, they actually seem to have a slight negative drift, 
as the average abnormal returns continue to be negative on all days after Day 2 except for 
Day 9 (+0,06% return, significant at 5% significance level). This implies that the market may 
actually overreact to the positive earnings surprises on the event date, Day 1 and Day 2, 
after which a price correction takes place. Similar behavior is not observable with the BN 
stocks, as the ongoing negative drift among them implies an underreaction to the earnings 
information. 
Third, it is observable from Table 6 that both the groups experience statistically significant 
positive abnormal returns also before the event date. For the GN stocks, it is possible that 
there are press releases, analyst forecast revisions or other small pieces of new information 
regarding the subsequent release of financial information that have transpired on those 
days. According to MacKinlay (1997), the market may acquire information about the 
earnings prior to the actual announcement, which may be observable from the pre-event 
returns, as in the case of this study. Scott (2015) further points out that as the earnings 
announcements are not the only source of information for investors, much of the 
information content in the earnings releases is likely to be already built into the stock prices 
by the time the earnings are announced. However, as mentioned, it is clearly observable 
also from the results of this study that the market could not anticipate all the information 
and, subsequently, the released information can be concluded to have value relevance.  
 
Further into the abnormal returns perceived before the event date, an interesting 
observation is that the BN stocks seem to also experience positive abnormal returns on Day 
-2 and -1. The positive pre-event average abnormal returns and the subsequent negative 
earnings surprise are not coherent with the above reasoning regarding the upfront 
absorbed information. With the GN stock, investors seem to have correctly anticipated the 
good news beforehand but with the BN stocks, they seem to have wrongly anticipated 
better news than actually was released and thus falsely bidden up the stock prices. 
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However, as this study investigates only the effects of the actual publishing of the financial 
statement, little can be said about the specific reasons causing the pre-announcement 
abnormal returns. 
Table 7. Cumulative average abnormal returns and the significance tests 
 
As Table 6 verified the level of significance of the AARs on a single day level, Table 7 further 
examines the significance of the CAARs between different time points in the event window. 
Consequently, these results explain whether the drift as a whole from t1 to t2 is of statistical 
significance or not.  
It is observable from the above table that among the BN stocks, the CAARs are significant 
at 1% significance level between all tested timepoints. Among the GN stocks, the CAARs 
are found to be statistically significant in all tested time periods including the event date 
(0;5, 0;10 and -10;10). However, when the event date is excluded and more limited time 
frame is tested, the CAARs among the GN stocks seem to gradually lose their significance. 
Moreover, when the time period tested begins as late as on Day 2, the CAARs among GN 
stocks are found to be insignificant. This further verifies the result that the drift among  the 
CAAR type CAAR value Adj. Pat. Z Sig. of CAAR CAAR value Adj. Pat. Z Sig. of CAAR
(0;5) 0.73 % 7.338 ** -1.47 % -9.138 **
(0;10) 0.49 % 4.785 ** -1.62 % -7.878 **
(1;2) 0.38 % 7.097 ** -0.44 % -4.282 **
(1;3) 0.27 % 5.077 ** -0.52 % -3.741 **
(1;4) 0.16 % 3.140 ** -0.57 % -3.944 **
(1;5) 0.10 % 2.446 * -0.71 % -4.282 **
(1;10) -0.14 % 1.064 -0.86 % -4.213 **
(2;5) -0.18 % -1.296 -0.46 % -2.912 **
(2;10) -0.42 % -1.565 -0.61 % -3.190 **
(-10;10) 0.91 % 5.311 ** -1.64 % -5.082 **
** = significant at 1% significance level
*   = significant at 5% significance level 
Bad NewsGood News
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GN stocks centers primarily within Days 1 and 2 after which a price correction takes place, 
while the BN stocks experience a longer and altogether more pronounced drift. 
From the practical point of view, these results together seem to suggest that a portfolio 
construction including a long position on the GN stocks from Day 0 to Day 2 and a short 
position on the BN stocks from Day 0 to Day 10 would have, on average, yielded riskless 
arbitrage profits. However, this statement is somewhat naïve as it does not take into 
account the possible transaction costs caused by i.e. constructing such a portfolio and 
further selling the stocks. The reader is also hereby reminded that according to Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980), Jensen (1978) and Fama (1991), there must be some quantity of 
abnormal profits to be made in the markets to compensate the informed investors for the 
costs of information collection. Thus, in equilibrium, the abnormal profits gained by 
informed investors equal exactly the costs of collecting the information (Grossman & 
Stiglitz 1980) and consequently, asset prices are reflecting information to the point where 
the marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the 
marginal costs (Jensen 1978; Fama 1991).  
As the portfolio construction and the determination of applicable transaction costs are 
beyond the scope of this study, it is hereby only noted that abnormal profits may have been 
able to be acquired following a strategy similar to what was just described. However, H1 
suggesting that statistically significant PEAD does exist in the European stock markets in 
2018 is hereby verified to be accurate especially when considering the BN stocks, as the 
AARs and CAARs among them were generally found to be of statistical significance. 
6.2. OLS regression analysis 
Going into the second part of the empirical findings, this section describes the results 
obtained with the OLS regression analyses. This includes reviewing the regression outputs 
of all of the four deployed regression models. 
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Model 1a 
A described in section 4.2.1., Model 1a was further specified based on the general Model 1 
so that the intrinsic value of the cumulative abnormal return from Day 1 to Day 2 for firm i 
was chosen to be the dependent variable. This choice was made in order to explain the 
short-term (two-day) drift with the independent variables. It should be further noted that 
the model takes no view wheter a single CAR(1;2)i in the sample is statistically significant 
or not.  
Model 1a was consequently defined as follows: 
│CAR(1;2)i │ = β0 + β1logMarketCapi + β2ITi  + β3ConsumerDiscretionaryi + β4HealthCarei  +  β5 Financialsi  +  β6CommunicationServicesi  +  β7Materialsi  + β8RealEstatei + β9ConsumerStaplesi  +  β10Utilitiesi  +  β11Energyi  +  ɛi                    (20) 
where 
│CAR(1;2)i │ =  the intrinsic value of the cumulative abnormal return from Day 1 to Day 
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk2 for firm i 
The independent variables are as described earlier in section 4.2.1. 
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Table 8. Regression output – Model 1a  
 
Table 8 goes through the regression output of Model 1a. First of all, it should be noted that 
the R2 and Adjusted R2 statistics of the model are very low. This implies that Model 1a as a 
whole does not explain the observed PEAD in European stock markets very well, as there 
surely are also many other determinants affecting the anomaly. However, there are still 
further points to be drawn out from Table 8. 
According to H2a, it was hypothesized that the coefficient estimate for logMarketCapi will 
be negative. As a prior assumption of the sign of the coefficient estimate was made, one-
sided significance test was conducted with the corresponding t-value presented in Table 8. 
The results are consistent with what was hypothesized, as the coefficient estimate for 
logMarketCapi is indeed found to be negative and statistically significant at 1% significance 
level. This result and the corresponding coefficient estimate can be further interpreted so 
that as the market capitalization increases 1%, the intrinsic value of the cumulative 
abnormal returns from Day 1 to Day 2 is expected to decrease on average 0.000019 
percentage points, ceteris paribus. A more practical comparison would be that as that the 
market capitalization doubles (i.e. increases 100%), the intrinsic value of CAR(1;2) is 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value P-value Sig.
Intercept 0.0683 0.0088 7.7842 0.0000 **
logMarketCap -0.0019 0.0004 -4.5062 0.0000 **
IT 0.0037 0.0030 1.2632 0.2067
ConsumerDiscretionary -0.0013 0.0030 -0.4213 0.6736
HealthCare 0.0057 0.0030 1.8660 0.0622
Financials -0.0071 0.0031 -2.3196 0.0205 *
CommunicationServices 0.0026 0.0037 0.7223 0.4702
Materials -0.0019 0.0037 -0.5204 0.6029
RealEstate -0.0101 0.0038 -2.6616 0.0078 **
ConsumerStaples -0.0016 0.0040 -0.3962 0.6920
Utilities -0.0044 0.0053 -0.8346 0.4041
Energy 0.0074 0.0042 1.7708 0.0768
** = significant at 1% significance level
*   = significant at 5% significance level 
R2  =  0.0339
Adjusted R2  =  0.0281
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expected to be on average 0.0019 percentage points lower, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, 
it can be argued that if two firms, say firm A and firm B, were operating in the same 
economic sector and firm A had a market capitalization ten times that of firm B, firm A 
would be expected to have on average 0.0171 percentage points lower intrinsic value of 
CAR(1;2) than firm B, ceteris paribus. 
Moreover, according to H3a, it was hypothesized that the coefficient estimates for the 
independent variables measuring the effect of economic sector on CAR(1;2)i will be 
insignificant and no prior assumption was made of the sign of these coefficient estimates 
(positive or negative). Therefore, a two-sided significance test is applicable and the 
corresponding significance level can be interpreted straight from the P-values presented in 
Table 8.  
On the contrary to what was hypothesized, Table 8 shows that the coefficient estimates for 
the dummy variables Financialsi and RealEstatei are found to be significant at 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. The interpretation of the corresponding coefficient 
suggests that compared to a firm operating in Industrials sector, the intrinsic value of the 
cumulative abnormal returns from Day 1 to Day 2 are expected to be on average (ceteris 
paribus) 0.0071 and 0.010 percentage points lower for a firm that operates in Financials 
and Real Estate sector, respectively.  
Model 1b 
Model 1b was as well constructed based on the general Model 1 so that the intrinsic values 
of cumulative abnormal returns from Day 1 to Day 5 were chosen to be the dependent 
variables. This choice was made to assess a longer (five-day) drift than with Model 1a to 
see if the relation between the independent and dependent variables changes with the 
length of the time period. Neither this model takes a view on whether a single CAR(1;5)i in 
the sample is statistically significant or not.  
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Model 1b was subsequently defined as follows: 
│CAR(1;5)i│ = β0 + β1logMarketCapi + β2ITi  + β3ConsumerDiscretionaryi + β4HealthCarei  +  β5 Financialsi  +  β6CommunicationServicesi  +  β7Materialsi  + β8RealEstatei + β9ConsumerStaplesi  +  β10Utilitiesi  +  β11Energyi  +  ɛi                          (21) 
where │CAR(1;5)i│ =  the intrinsic value of the cumulative abnormal return from Day 1 to Day 5 
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllfor firm i 
The independent variables are again as described earlier in section 4.2.1. 
Table 9. Regression output – Model 1b 
 
The regression output of Model 1b is presented in Table 9. Again, the R2 and Adjsuted R2 
statistics remain low but are still somewhat higher compared to the ones obtained with 
Model 1a. This implies that the right-hand side of the Model 1 is slighty more relevant in 
explaining the intrsinsic values of the CARs from Day 1 to Day 5 than the intrinsic values of 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value P-value Sig.
Intercept 0.0986 0.0107 9.2307 0.0000 **
logMarketCap -0.0029 0.0005 -5.6532 0.0000 **
IT 0.0011 0.0036 0.3096 0.7569
ConsumerDiscretionary 0.0004 0.0037 0.1108 0.9118
HealthCare 0.0110 0.0037 2.9748 0.0030 **
Financials -0.0086 0.0037 -2.2986 0.0216 *
CommunicationServices 0.0045 0.0044 1.0180 0.3088
Materials -0.0026 0.0045 -0.5705 0.5684
RealEstate -0.0165 0.0046 -3.5765 0.0004 **
ConsumerStaples 0.0008 0.0049 0.1666 0.8677
Utilities -0.0048 0.0065 -0.7454 0.4561
Energy 0.0135 0.0051 2.6350 0.0085 **
** = significant at 1% significance level
*   = significant at 5% significance level 
R2  =  0.0499
Adjusted R2  =  0.0442
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the CARs from Day 1 to Day 2. Referring to H2a, it was again hypothesized that the 
coefficient estimate for logMarketCapi will be negative.  
Similar to the regression output of Model 1a, the regression output of Model 1b also finds 
the negative association between the market capitalization and magnitude of the 
cumulative abnormal returns to be significant. The coefficient estimate for logMarketCapi  
remains negative and significant at 1% significant level with a higher t-value than in Model 
1a. The corresponding coefficient estimate can be further interpreted so that as the market 
capitalization increases 1%, the intrinsic value of the cumulative abnormal returns from 
Day 1 to Day 5 is expected to decrease on average 0.000029 percentage points, ceteris 
paribus. Again, a more reasonable comparison would be that as the market capitalization 
doubles, the intrinsic value of CAR(1;5) is expected to decrease on average 0.0029 
percentage points, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, firm A having a market capitalization ten 
times that of firm B would be expected to have 0.0261 percentage points lower intrinsic 
value of CAR(1;5) compared to firm B, ceteris paribus. Similar to the interpretation of the 
results of Model 1a, this implies in general that higher market capitalization suggests a 
milder deviation from the expected returns also within Day 1 and Day 5. 
Referring to H3a as with Model 1a, it was again hypothesized that the coefficient estimates 
for the independent variables measuring the effect of economic sector on CAR(1;5)i will be 
insignificant and no prior assumption was made of the sign of these coefficient estimates 
(positive or negative). Compared to the regression output of Model 1a, Table 9 shows that 
the coefficient estimates for Financialsi and RealEstatei are again found to be significant at 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. In addition to that, the coefficient estimates for 
HealtCarei and Energyi are also found to be significant at 1% significance level.  
The corresponding coefficients suggest that compared to a firm operating in Industrials 
sector, the intrinsic value of CAR(1;5) is expected to be on average (ceteris paribus) 0.0086 
and 0.0165 percentage points lower for a firm operating in Financials and Real Estate 
sector, respectively. Furthermore, again compared to a firm operating in Industrials sector, 
the intrinsic value of CAR(1;5) is expected to be on average (ceteris paribus) 0.0110 and 
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0.0135 percentage higher for a firm operating in Health Care and Energy sector, 
respectively. 
Model 1c 
As the models 1a and 1b, Model 1c was also derived from the general Model 1 so that the 
intrinsic values of cumulative abnormal returns from Day 1 to Day 10 were chosen to be 
the dependent variables. The purpose of this model is to explain the long-term (ten-day) 
drift with the already familiar independent variables. As with the two previous models, 
neither this model takes a view on whether a single CAR(1;10)i in the sample is statistically 
significant or not.  
Model 1c was subsequently defined as follows: 
│CAR(1;10)i│ = β0 + β1logMarketCapi + β2ITi  + β3ConsumerDiscretionaryi + β4HealthCarei  +  β5 Financialsi  +  β6CommunicationServicesi  +  β7Materialsi  + β8RealEstatei + β9ConsumerStaplesi  +  β10Utilitiesi  +  β11Energyi  +  ɛi                     (22) 
where │CAR(1;10)i│ =  the intrinsic value of the cumulative abnormal return from Day 1 to Day 
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll10 for firm i 
The independent variables are again as described earlier in section 4.2.1. 
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Table 10. Regression output – Model 1c 
 
Table 10 represents the regression output for Model 1c. As with the two previous models, 
the R2 and Adjusted R2 statistics are again far from high, but Model 1c still offers the highest 
values of these statistics. As no further variables were at any point added to the right-hand 
side of the model, the comparison of the R2 statistics of the three different models imply 
that the independent variables of the model can (only) slightly better explain the intrinsic 
values of the cumulative abnormal returns as the time period for measuring the CARs is 
prolonged. 
Going into the significance of the coefficient estimates, the negative association between 
firm size and the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns is further emphasized with 
Model 1c. The coefficient estimate for logMarketCapi is again found to be negative and 
significant at 1% significance level as with the two previous models, and the result suggests 
that as the market capitalization increases 1%, the intrinsic value of the cumulative 
abnormal returns from Day 1 to Day 10 is expected to decrease on average 0.000035 
percentage points, ceteris paribus. Similar to the previous practical examples, the intrinsic 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value P-value Sig.
Intercept 0.1175 0.0129 9.1121 0.0000 **
logMarketCap -0.0035 0.0006 -5.5953 0.0000 **
IT 0.0063 0.0044 1.4434 0.1491
ConsumerDiscretionary 0.0035 0.0044 0.7818 0.4344
HealthCare 0.0213 0.0045 4.7641 0.0000 **
Financials -0.0044 0.0045 -0.9718 0.3313
CommunicationServices 0.0055 0.0054 1.0284 0.3039
Materials -0.0028 0.0055 -0.5161 0.6059
RealEstate -0.0179 0.0056 -3.2108 0.0013 **
ConsumerStaples -0.0020 0.0059 -0.3386 0.7350
Utilities -0.0029 0.0078 -0.3736 0.7088
Energy 0.0198 0.0062 3.2070 0.0014 **
** = significant at 1% significance level
*   = significant at 5% significance level 
R2  =  0.0574
Adjusted R2  =  0.0518
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value of CAR(1;10) is expected to be on average 0.0035 and 0.0315 percentage points lower 
for firms having market capitalization doubled or tenfolded, respectively (ceteris paribus). 
This result further amplifies the argument that higher market capitalization is indeed 
related to a milder deviation from the expected returns.  
As with the two previous models, contradictory evidence to H3a is also provided. The 
coefficient estimates for the dummy variables HealthCarei, RealEstatei and Energyi are 
found to be statistically significant, all of them at 1% significance level. The corresponding 
coefficients suggest that compared to a firm operating in Industrials sector, the intrinsic 
value of CAR(1;10) is expected to be on average (ceteris paribus) 0.0179 percentage points 
lower for a firm operating in Real Estate sector. In addition, again compared to a firm 
operating in Industrials sector, the intrinsic value of CAR(1;10) is expected to be on average 
(ceteris paribus) 0.0213 and 0.0198 percentage points higher for a firm operating in Health 
Care and Energy sector, respectively. 
Model 2 
Model 2 deviates from models 1a, 1b and 1c in the sense that it is the length of the drift in 
days from the event date onwards that is of interest, rather than the magnitude of the 
cumulative abnormal returns. This model is constructed to find out whether the 
independent variables in question have an effect on the length rather than on the 
magnitude of the drift.  
Model 2 was therefore constucted as follows: 
Li = β0 + β1logMarketCapi + β2ITi  + β3ConsumerDiscretionaryi + β4HealthCarei  +  β5Financialsi  +  β6CommunicationServicesi  +  β7Materialsi  + β8RealEstatei + β9ConsumerStaplesi  +  β10Utilitiesi  +  β11Energyi  +  ɛi                                                     (19) 
where 
Li = Length of the drift for firm i, measured in days from the event date onwards so that 
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if ARi,0  >  0,  ARi,1  <  0 or if ARi,0  <  0,  ARi,1  >  0,  then Li = 0 
if ARi,0  >  0,  ARi,1  >  0 or if  ARi,0  <  0,  ARi,1  <  0, then Li = 1 
if ARi,0  >  0, ARi,1  >  0 , ARi,2  > 0 or if  ARi,0  <  0, ARi,1  <  0 , ARi,2  < 0, then Li = 2 
if ARi,0  >  0, ARi,1  >  0, ARi,2  > 0, ARi,3  > 0 or if  ARi,0  <  0, ARi,1  <  0, ARi,2  < 0, ARi,3  < 
0, then Li = 3 
. . .  
if ARi,0  >  0, ARi,1  >  0, ARi,2  > 0, ARi,3  > 0, ARi,4  >  0, ARi,5  >  0, ARi,6  > 0, ARi,7  > 0, ARi,8  
>  0, ARi,9  > 0, ARi,10  > 0  or if  ARi,0  <  0, ARi,1  <  0, ARi,2  < 0, ARi,3  < 0, ARi,4  <  0, ARi,5  
<  0, ARi,6  < 0, ARi,7  < 0, ARi,8  <  0, ARi,9  < 0, ARi,10 < 0, then y = 10 
, Li = 0, 1, 2, 3, … , 10. 
The independent variables remain as described earlier in section 4.2.1. 
Table 11. Regression output – Model 2  
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value P-value Sig.
Intercept 1.3769 0.3734 3.6876 0.0002 **
logMarketCap -0.0152 0.0179 -0.8537 0.3934
IT 0.1050 0.1262 0.8323 0.4054
ConsumerDiscretionary -0.1036 0.1281 -0.8084 0.4189
HealthCare 0.0696 0.1297 0.5368 0.5915
Financials -0.1090 0.1310 -0.8321 0.4054
CommunicationServices 0.0698 0.1555 0.4493 0.6533
Materials -0.0782 0.1587 -0.4926 0.6224
RealEstate -0.1529 0.1611 -0.9487 0.3429
ConsumerStaples -0.0285 0.1703 -0.1674 0.8670
Utilities 0.3573 0.2256 1.5833 0.1135
Energy 0.0545 0.1790 0.3043 0.7610
** = significant at 1% significance level
*   = significant at 5% significance level 
R2  =  0.0053
Adjusted R2  =  -0.0007
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Table 11 represents the regression output for Model 2. Compared to the three previous 
models, the R2 statistics are much closer to zero (the definition for adjusted R2 allows it to 
be negative but is interpreted hereby as zero), which suggests that the independent 
variables on the right-hand side of the model poorly explain the length of the drift. None 
of the independent variables are found to be statistically significant, so it can be stated that 
firm size and economic sector do not have explanatory power when it comes to explaining 
the length of the post-announcement drift. 
6.3. Summary, discussion & limitations 
Regarding the results of the event study, the reader should be first reminded that the 
observed statistically significant abnormal returns on the event date are completely in line 
with the efficient market hypothesis, as by defitition an efficient securities market (semi-
strong form) is one where the prices of securities traded on that market at all times fully 
reflect all information that is publicly known about these securities. On the event date, new 
information comes public and the Market model used to calculate the normal returns is 
obviously unable to predict the nature of this information. It is therefore the abnormal 
returns during the days after the event date that one should focus on. Thus, it is the AARs 
and CAARs this study found to be statistically significant also after the event date that 
constitute evidence contradicting the efficient market hypothesis. 
Maybe the most interesting finding regarding the event study analysis was that the GN and 
BN stocks were found to behave differently and thus, also the interpretation of the results 
differs between these two groups. The average market reaction regarding the GN stocks 
implies an initial overreaction to earnings information, after which the stock prices are 
downward-corrected. On the contrary, the average market reaction regarding the BN 
stocks suggests an underreaction to earnings information, as the post-announcement 
abnormal returns continued to be negative until the end of the event window.  
Richardson et al. (2010) as well as Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) have stated that the main 
feature of PEAD is that investors appear to underreact to earnings announcements and 
consequently, a company’s stock price and the cumulative abnormal returns for that stock 
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tend to drift in the direction of the earnings news several days or even weeks after an 
earnings announcement. Leaning on this definition emphasizing the role of market 
underreaction as the determinant of PEAD, it can be stated that the anomaly was hereby 
found to be present only among the BN stocks. The message of this argument is to illustrate 
that the timeframe is of major importance as it is concluded whether PEAD is present in 
the markets or not. Had this study determined the event window to end on Day 2, the 
conclusion would have been that both of the groups experience an initial underreaction to 
earnings information.  
Although the post-announcement behaviour of the GN and BN stocks was found to be 
distinct from each others, it can be jointly stated that neither of the groups behave as the 
efficient market hypothesis would suggest. From the theorethical perspective, it can be 
asked if the European stock markets in 2018 are efficient in the sense that the market 
participants correctly react to the earnings information so that an immidiate and a justified 
price correction takes place. The answer provided with this study is an unambiguous no. 
From the practical point of view, it can be further wondered whether the European stock 
markets in 2018 are efficient in the sense that arbitrage profits cannot be made. The 
answer is maybe not, but the final affirmation would require further examination and 
determination of the applicable transaction costs. This is because rational investors are 
willing to arbitrage the anomaly away only to the extent where the marginal costs equal 
the marginal benefits (Fama 1991; Jensen 1978). 
To further discuss about market efficiency, it is hereby reminded that the definition of the 
efficient securities markets (semi-strong form) implies that publicly known information is 
at all times incorporated into stock prices. This implies immidiate stock price reaction to 
new information. This obviously is the theorethical model, and it does not take into account 
the fact that it surely takes at least a little time for the market parcitipants to analyze the 
newly announced information. Thus, it is not possible that the market at all times reflects 
all public knowledge because there occurs an inevitable delay in processing information 
due to human (and/or machine) qualities.  
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Therefore, a question rises that if the immidiate reaction per se is impossible, what is the 
acceptable time frame in which the price adjustment should be complete so that the 
markets can be viewed as efficient? Is it 1 minute, 6 hours, 24 hours or longer? The writer’s 
opinion is that the definition of the market efficiency should adjust relative to the market 
parcitipants abilities to process information, which has undisputably increased during 
recent decades. If the definition of market efficiency remains unadjusted while the abilities 
of the market parcitipants evolve, it can lead to over-maintaining the null of market 
efficiency. Apparently, this problem is still to be faced as the null of market efficiency on a 
daily level remains at least strongly questioned if not fully rejected based on the results of 
this study. 
The event study analysis conducted has also some limitations to it. First, the earnings 
surprises for the sample companies obtained from Datastream were calculated based on 
the average of analyst forecasts rather than historical stock prices. Thus, the observed drift 
classifies as AF drift and the subsequent results cannot at face value be extrapolated to be 
consistent with the situation where the seasonal random-walk based (RW) earnings 
surprise is the underlying assumption. This is also because the two distinct drifts are found 
to be qualitatively quite different from each others (Ayers et al. 2011). Further, when 
estimating the abnormal returns for the sample stocks in the event window, the betas in 
the deployed Market model were assumed to be stationary. As Ball, Kothari and Watts 
(1993) noted, this may cause a slight bias in estimated abnormal returns as betas are 
actually shifting upward (downward) for firms with high (low) unexpected earnings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
Table 12. Summary of the regression outputs  
 
Table 12 further summarizes the results obtained with the OLS regression analyses. The 
first message of the upper part of the table is that the R2 and Adjusted R2 statistics mildly 
but gradually increased as the time period for observing the cumulative abnormal returns 
was prolonged (Models 1a-1c). This implies that firm size and economic sector explain the 
longer post-announcement drift slightly better than the shorter drift. Still, it has to be 
concluded that overall the models did not very well fit to the data and generally, the 
cumulative abnormal returns cannot be reliably estimated with just firm size and economic 
sector. The second message of the upper part of the table is that seemingly, the length of 
the drift (measured as days from the event date onwards) cannot be reliably estimated 
based on firm size and economic sector either (Model 2), as the R2 and Adjusted R2 statistics 
for this particular model were essentially zero. 
Moving to the lower part of the Table 12, further conclusions can be drawn. First, H2a 
suggesting that firm size is inversely related to the magnitude of the drift was proven to be 
accurate with the models 1a-1c. Hereby, it can be stated that the null H0: β1 = 0 is in the 
Dependent var.
R2
Adjusted R2
Variable Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig.
logMarketCap -0.0019 ** -0.0029 ** -0.0035 ** -0.0152
(logRevenue) -0.0012 ** -0.0020 ** -0.0026 ** -0.0236
(logTotalAssets) -0.0013 ** -0.0020 ** -0.0026 ** -0.0179
IT
Cons.Discretionary
Health Care 0.0057 0.0110 ** 0.0213 ** 0.0696
Financials -0.0071 * -0.0086 * -0.0044 -0.1090
Comm.Services
Materials
RealEstate -0.0101 ** -0.0165 ** -0.0179 ** -0.1529
ConsumerStaples
Utilities
Energy 0.0074 0.0135 ** 0.0198 ** 0.0545
** = significant at 1% significance level
*   = significant at 5% significance level 
0.04990.0339 0.0574 0.0053
0.04420.0281 0.0518 -0.0007
Model 1c Model 2
CAR(1;2) CAR(1;5) CAR(1;10) Lenght of the drift
Model 1a Model 1b
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models 1a-1c rejected with 99% confidence level. To further prove the point, a sensitivity 
analysis for the size variable logMarketCapi was conducted so that all of the regression 
models were re-estimated by replacing logMarketCapi with variables logRevenuei and 
logTotalAssetsi (both in different stages to avoid multicollinearity issues). The coefficient 
estimates for the additional size variables were also found to be negative and significant in 
each of the models 1a-1c, which is intuitive considering that using Pearson correlation, 
corr(logMarketCap, logTotalAssets) = 0.8892, corr(logMarketCap, logRevenue) = 0.8209 
and corr(logTotalAssets, logRevenue) = 0.8400.  
These results regarding the sensitivity analysis imply that changing the size variable does 
not significantly alter the conclusions, although the coefficients for logRevenuei and 
logTotalAssetsi were generally found to be smaller than for logMarketCapi. This observed 
negative association between firm size and the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal 
returns is in line with previous studies (e.g. Barber et al. 2013; Bhushan 1994; Foster et al. 
1984; Garfinkel & Sokobin 2005), where PEAD was found to be stronger among smaller 
firms’ stocks. 
Table 12 further provides contradictory evidence for H3a suggesting that economic sector 
has no effect on the magnitude of the PEAD. First of all, the coefficient estimates for 
HealtCarei were found to be positive and significant in Models 1b and 1c, suggesting that a 
firm operating in Health Care sector has higher intrinsic values of cumulative abnormal 
returns compared to a firm operating in Industrials sector, ceteris paribus. This result can 
be at least partly explained with re-introducing Table 5 (below) and noting that in this case, 
the size variable logMarketCapi got to work through the economic sector variables, as from 
all of the 11 economic sectors, the Health Care sector has the second lowest median value 
of market capitalization. Similar (but inverse) is the situation with the Financials sector, as 
the median value of market capitalization for that sector is the second highest and the 
estimated coefficients were found to be negative and significant.  
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Table 5. Sector-specific descriptive statistics for Market Cap (in millions of €)  
 
However, a reasoning like this is not relevant with the Real Estate and Energy sectors, as 
the median values of market capitalization for these sectors do not differ much from the 
median value of market capitalization for the Industrials sector. Considering the Energy 
sector, at least a partial explanation can be offered with the fact that it is the most 
unrepresentative sector in the sample with n = 84. This may have distorted the power of 
the regression analysis and the robustness of the results.  
Finally, the coefficient estimates for the Real Estate sector were found to be negative and 
significant in each of the models 1a-1c. This result cannot be explained with the above 
arguments, so it seems that the magnitude of PEAD indeed differs between Real Estate and 
Industrials sectors so that the magnitude of PEAD for firms operating in the Real Estate 
sector is, on average, lower (ceteris paribus). This result provides mild contradictory 
evidence compared to previous studies, as for example Doyle et al. (2006) found that there 
is no significant variation in the magnitude of PEAD between different industries. 
In addition, the limitations of using dummy variables have to be kept in mind when 
interpreting these regression results. The coefficient estimates for the sector dummies 
inherently tell the difference relative to the Industrials sector, but no arguments can be 
made e.g. on how the abnormal returns in the Financials sector differ from those of the 
Economic sector Median MC Mean MC Largest MC Smallest MC
Utilities 2,617.93 7,484.70 52,155.07 41.77
Financials 2,274.99 8,486.05 88,409.99 40.73
Materials 1,304.05 5,491.42 84,261.24 1.09
Consumer Staples 1,109.37 10,664.90 223,139.34 8.19
Communication Services 853.80 4,260.29 70,445.78 6.07
Real Estate 831.25 2,058.09 20,967.05 13.14
Industrials 785.17 3,456.83 64,288.15 1.74
Energy 720.01 10,033.76 233,560.89 3.06
Consumer Discretionary 561.80 5,205.98 124,416.19 8.47
Health Care 298.72 4,809.17 183,717.98 2.87
IT 240.74 1,990.45 114,803.72 2.98
Total sample 666.90 5,078.79 233,560.89 1.09
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Utilities sector. This kind of analysis would require changing the reference category and the 
variables in the regression models. 
For hypothesis H2b, suggesting that firm size is inversely related to the length of PEAD, no 
supporting evidence was found with Model 2. As stated, the R2 and Adjusted R2 statistics 
for this particular model were essentially zero and none of the coefficient estimates for the 
size variables used was found to be significant. Thus, with Model 2, H0: β1 = 0 is maintained 
with the respective significance levels. Regarding H3b, neither the economic sector was 
found to have an effect on the length of PEAD, which means that also the null H0: β2  - β11 
= 0 is maintained with the respective significance levels. The following chart provides at 
least a partial explanation for this result and illustrates the limitations of Model 2. 
Chart 3. Sample divided based on the length of PEAD  
 
Chart 3 divides the sample based on the length of PEAD. It is observable from the above 
figure that almost half of the stocks in the total sample did not experience a drift at all, 
when the drift was measured strictly from the event date onwards. In other words, half of 
the sample stocks had negative (positive) abnormal returns on the event date and 
consecutive positive (negative) abnormal returns on Day 1. Moreover, it seems that a great 
majority (around 94%) of the sample stocks experienced a three-day or shorter drift.  
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To explain this distribution, it should be emphasized that the defitition of Li in Model 2 did 
not take the possible drift in the middle of the (0;10) window into account. This means that 
a particular stock may have experienced for example positive abnormal returns on all days 
from Day 1 to Day 10, but if that stock had negative abnormal returns on the event date 
(Day 0), the drift was classified to be non-existent (Li = 0). Neither did the definition of Li in 
Model 2 allow the sign of the abnormal returns to change even once. This means that if a 
stock experienced for example negative abnormal returns on days 0-2 and further on days 
4-10, but positive abnormal returns on Day 3, the length of the drift was defined to be only 
two days. This strict definition for the variable Li measuring the length of PEAD may be one 
of the reasons why no significance was found to be present among the results of Model 2. 
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7. Conclusions 
The post-earnings announcement drift is one of the most researched, yet one of the most 
controversial financial market anomalies found to date. The main feature of PEAD is that 
the stock prices do not immidiately react to earnings announcements as suggested by the 
efficient market hypothesis, but fluctuate in the direction of the earnings news for some 
time after the announcement. What separates PEAD from other market anomalies is its 
major persistency despite the amount of research and the attention it has gained during 
the past 50 years.  
Originally, researches have argued whether the PEAD anomaly reflects poor risk 
adjustment in the underlying asset pricing models or pure market inefficiencies. Recent 
evidence seems to be however more consistent with the market inefficiency explanation. 
Thereby, the existence of the anomaly has been attributed e.g. to the level of investor 
sophistication as well as to the constraints set by limited attention and other psychological 
biases, preventing the public information to be immidiately absorbed into stock prices as 
the efficient market hypothesis would suggest. In addition, the existence of transaction 
costs seems to prevent rational investors from fully arbitraging the anomaly away. The  
evidence on whether investors in practice can exploit PEAD to gain net of cost arbitrage 
returns remains, however, ambiguous. 
This study investigated the extent to which the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly 
is present in European stock markets in 2018, as well as how firm size and economic sector 
affect the magnitude and length of the drift. The results provide evidence that the anomaly 
is still present in the markets and is flourishing especially among the companies reporting 
negative news relative to what was expected by the analysts. The drift for these stocks 
implies an underreaction to earnings releases, whereas for the companies reporting 
positive news compared to what the analysts had expected, the results suggest an 
overreaction to earnings news. The fact that there is obvious serial correlation present 
especially among the abnormal returns for the bad news stocks, along the result that the 
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markets react differently to negative and positive earnings surprises, provides evidence 
contradicting the efficient market hypothesis. 
Moreover, it was examined if the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift can 
be attributed to firm size and economic sector. It was found that firm size is inversely 
related to the magnitude of the drift, which provides supplementary evidence for previous 
research and verifies the relation of firm size and PEAD to be accurate also in these 
previously quite unexplored stock markets. These results suggest that for larger firms, there 
exists a more immediate price reaction after the earnings announcements. For smaller 
firms, in turn, the delayed price response was found to be more pronounced.  
The relation between the economic sector and PEAD was, however, found to be of more 
controversial by nature. The magnitude of PEAD was indeed found to vary between certain 
economic sectors, but the fact that different economic sectors have companies of different 
sizes prevents the conclusion that the economic sector alone causes the variation in PEAD. 
The only sectors between which the variation was significant and the influence of firm size 
on the observed variation could be at least partially ruled out were the Industrials sector 
and Real Estate sector.  
In addition, it was examined if the length of the post-earnings announcement drift could 
be attributed to firm size and economic sector. The unambiguous result was that the length 
of the drift is not explainable by these variables. Altogether, the deployed regression 
models could not explain the magnitude or the length of the post announcement drift very 
well, which further emphasizes the complicated nature of the anomaly.  
Altogehter, the results of this study further verify the fact that despite the overwhelming 
attention gained, this anomaly can still be found to be present in the markets while 
conventional attempts to find causal relations fail in searching of the primary source of the 
anomaly. As Bernard and Seyhun (1997) already argued, the further attempts to explain 
PEAD would be most fruitfully focused on reasons why market prices do not reflect all 
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available information. This requires also additional deployment of other than quantitative 
methods as well as drawing from the continuosly developing trend of behavioural finance.   
In addition, as for example the flash trading by computers has dramatically increased over 
the last decade and the microstructure of the markets is under continuous change, it can 
be argued that event studies using daily stock data are somewhat behind. As previous 
research has documented that PEAD (on daily level) is decreasing, it is recommended that 
further quantitative studies verged on this matter also with hourly stock data to assess the 
possibility of short window arbitrage profits. Nevertheless, the fundamental question of 
why PEAD exists is turning out to be more a matter of behavioural and social sciences than 
that of a quantitative economic analysis.  
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